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Abstract: Consumers’ health plan choices are highly persistent even though optimal
plans change over time. This paper separates two sources of inertia, inattention to plan
choice and switching costs. We develop a panel data model with separate attention
and choice stages, linked by heterogeneity in acuity, i.e., the ability and willingness to
make diligent choices. Using data from Medicare Part D, we find that inattention is
an important source of inertia but switching costs also play a role, particularly for low-
acuity individuals. Separating the two stages and allowing for heterogeneity is crucial for
counterfactual simulations of interventions that reduce inertia.
Keywords: Medicare; prescription drugs; health insurance demand; dynamic discrete
choice.
JEL classification: I13; D12; J14; C25.
Acknowledgments: An earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title, “Plan switching and inertia in Medicare
Part D: Evidence from administrative data.” This research was funded by the Behavioral and Social Research program of
the National Institute on Aging (grants P01AG05842-18, P01AG033559, R56AG026622-01A1, and RC4AG039036), with
additional support from the E. Morris Cox Fund at the University of California, Berkeley, and from Deutsche Forschungs-
gemeinschaft through CRC TRR 190 (project 280092119). We gratefully acknowledge comments by, and discussions with,
Abi Adams, Eric French, Dana Goldman, Ben Handel, Kathleen McGarry, Nicole Maestas, Filip Matějka, Takeshi Murooka,
Maria Polyakova, and Justin Sydnor, participants at the 2014 AEA meetings in Philadelphia, the 2014 ASHEcon confer-
ence in Los Angeles, the 2014 CESifo Conference on Behavioral Economics in Munich, the 2014 CEAR/MRIC Behavioral
Insurance Workshop in Munich, the 2014 German Health Econometrics Workshop in Wuppertal, the 2015 NBER Summer
Institute, the 2015 Workshop on Policyholder Behavior at ETH Zurich, the 2016 EuHEA meetings in Hamburg, as well as
seminar audiences at cemmap/UCL, DIW Berlin, George Mason University, Harvard University, Helmut Schmidt Univer-
sity Hamburg, Northwestern University, and the universities of Basel, Copenhagen, Essex, Leuven, Lugano, Lund, Oxford,
Regensburg, St. Gallen, Tübingen, Wuppertal, Würzburg, and Zurich.
“A wealth of information creates a poverty of attention.”
Herbert Simon
1 Introduction
The recent trend towards giving consumers more choice about their health plans has
invited research on how good they are at making these decisions. Data come from private
markets (such as employer-sponsored health coverage) as well as from health insurance
programs that are oﬀered or subsidized by governments. The Medicare Part D market
for prescription drug insurance is an important example. A rapidly expanding literature
analyzes Part D enrollment and plan choices, using both survey and administrative data.
Generally, initial plan choices in Medicare Part D are diﬃcult to reconcile with standard
normative models of decision-making; see for instance Abaluck and Gruber (2011) and
Heiss et al . (2013).1 Evidence from other health insurance markets also finds that people
make poor decision, such as choosing expensive, demonstratively dominated plans; see
Bhargava et al . (2017).
Initial plan choice is only one aspect of consumer choice in Medicare Part D. Consumers
stay in Medicare Part D for many years, and at the end of each year have an open
enrollment period when they can switch plans.2 Current enrollees are ordinarily reenrolled
in their current plan by default if they take no action, so that attention is required only
if the enrollee wants to consider a switch.3 Enrollees experience changes over time in
their health and prescriptions drug needs. Moreover, the menu of plans and features
oﬀered also change from year to year. In addition, recent reforms implement changes
in the copayment and coverage structure of Medicare Part D plans, such as the gradual
abolishment of the infamous coverage gap. As a result, enrollees who consider switching
plans face a choice that is as complex as their initial plan choice.4
1 We review the literature on plan choices in Medicare Part D in Section 2.2.
2 Each year during the Medicare Part D annual enrollment period that runs between October 15 and
December 7, individuals on Medicare have the opportunity to enroll in Part D, or if they are enrolled,
to switch plans. Switching plans does not involve any fees, and as at initial enrollment, plans have to
accept all individuals. Important institutional features of the Medicare Part D market are described in
Bach and McClellan (2005), Duggan et al . (2008) and Heiss et al . (2010), among others. We provide
an overview in Section 2.1.
3 An infrequent exception that forces attention is the termination of an enrollee’s current plan without
a “cross-walk” to a new or consolidated plan that is the designated default for re-enrollment.
4 Ketcham et al . (2012) conclude that Part D decisions improve over time with enrollee experience. Our
results suggest that most of this learning comes from the first enrollment experience, and selection
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Inertia may be attributed to the presence of defaults, lack of events that trigger consumers’
attention, low expecations of improvement, or high costs of considering and carrying out
switches.5 If inertia leads to suboptimal switching choices in the Part D market, there
are not only direct welfare losses to enrollees, but also overall eﬀects on market eﬃciency
and welfare due to strategic behavior of insurers.6
In this paper, our objectives are to characterize the sources of inertia, to study the events
that trigger switching in the presence of inertia, and to simulate and compare the eﬀects of
interventions aimed at reducing inertia. We specify a model of consumer choice with two
crucial features. First, the model comprises separate attention and plan-selection stages,
to separate inattention to plan choice from switching costs as reasons for inertia. These
stages are distinct and econometrically identified by fundamental exclusion restrictions:
Attention is triggered by events that have occurred before the current enrollment period;
e.g., discontinuation of previous plan, incidence of a new health condition, or a shock from
an announced change in current plan premium or formulary. Plan choices are driven by
future costs and expected benefits, information that is not acquired by the inattentive
consumer. Then, past attention triggers should be irrelevant to and excluded from plan
choice made by attentive consumers, while future features and costs of plans other than
a previous plan, which the consumer can learn only by paying attention, are logically
excluded from the attention stage. As Abaluck and Gruber (2016a) note, the distinction
between attention and plan choice stages has important normative implications for the
design of defaults and other policies that encourage thoughtful health decisions. Second,
our choice model allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the ability and willingness to
make diligent choices. In the following, we call this latent factor “acuity”. It aﬀects all
on decision-making skills is a better explanation than cumulative market experience for subsequent
outcomes achieved by plan switchers.
5 When attention is a scarce resource, bounded rationality or rational inattention may lead the consumer
to focus on a limited number of decisions where there is potentially high payoﬀ to diligence, leaving
many choices to be made by “fast thinking” heuristics or reliance on defaults; see Simon (1955) and
Kahneman (2011) for an early and a more recent perspectives on the broader issue, Gabaix (2017) for
a comprehensive review of the economics literature on inattention, and Matějka and McKay (2015),
Abaluck and Adams (2017), and Gibbard (2017) for the implications of inattention for discrete choice
modelling. Attention involves direct costs of collecting and processing information on alternatives, and
opportunity costs of inattention to other choice tasks.
6 The mechanisms that suppliers commonly employ to exploit inertia, such as raising prices or reducing
benefits to returning enrollees, are largely but not entirely eliminated by regulations on oﬀered plans
in the Part D market. More importantly, when inertia allows ineﬃcient plans to survive in the market,
they increase the average benefit paid, eventually increasing the burden on taxpayers from the market?s
substantial government subsidy. For further discussion, see Handel (2013), Ericson (2014), Handel and
Kolstad (2015), Polyakova (2016), Ho et al . (2017), Decarolis et al . (2019).
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stages of the choice model: acuity increases the propensity to be attentive, influences
apparent switching cost, and reduces noise in plan choice.
Estimation and simulation of our two-stage model of plan switching use administrative
data on Medicare Part D plan choice and prescription drug use for 2007 through 2010.7 A
preliminary, descriptive analysis confirms that annual plan switching rates in the Medicare
Part D market are low, a finding in line with earlier studies of plan switching in this and
many other markets, see Section 2.2. We characterize switching behavior descriptively
in terms of overspending, defined as the diﬀerence between the consumer’s total costs8
induced by the plan the consumer has chosen and that of the least-cost alternative (for
given prescription drug use).9 We find that overspending is much lower among individuals
who switch plans than for stayers. Overspending is furthermore lower for those who
switch when they have an available default than for those who are forced to make a
choice (because they do not have a default plan as they enter Part D for the first time
or their old plan is not available any more). This finding suggests that those individuals
who make an active switching decision are selected, which is reflected in our structural
model. Our descriptive analysis further suggests that overspending is not fully explained
by unobserved plan characteristics that might lead consumers to optimally choose plans
associated with higher overspending.10
Individuals making an active plan choice may stay with their default plan because it is
optimal, or because switching costs are too high. In discrete choice models, such switching
costs are typically captured by including a dummy variable for the default plan – which
typically is just the old plan – with a coeﬃcient interpreted as a monetary estimate of
the disutility of switching; see Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for a review of the literature
on switching costs in industrial organization and Shcherbakov (2016) for a more recent
example. Studies of switching behavior in Medicare Part D and other health care markets
that use such models include Miller and Yeo (2012), Nosal (2012), Handel (2013), Ericson
7 We restrict our analysis to individuals enrolled in a stand-alone prescription drug plan (i. e., not in
managed care) and who are not eligible for a Low-Income Subsidy (LIS). Further details are given in
Section 3.
8 The total costs that the consumer has to bear include premiums, deductibles, and copayments that
she has to pay for prescription drugs.
9 Overspending has been defined and studied in several earlier studies of Medicare Part D plan choice,
including Abaluck and Gruber (2011), Heiss et al . (2013), and Abaluck and Gruber (2016a). In Section
3 we discuss how the overspending measure we use here is constructed.
10 This observation is related to a more general discussion about the use of parameterized models of choice
behavior to study the rationality of consumers in Medicare Part D and other markets, see Ketcham
et al . (2016) and Abaluck and Gruber (2016b). We return to this issue in the concluding Section 7.
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(2014), Handel and Kolstad (2015), Abaluck and Gruber (2016a), and Polyakova (2016).
These studies also provide discussions of the sources of switching costs in health insurance
markets, the most important one being transaction or “hassle” costs. We review these
studies in more detail in Section 2.2.
The approach of including a dummy variable for the default plan in a discrete choice
model implies that each individual compares the available plans in each year and delib-
erately makes a choice – which seems unrealistic when the availability of a default or
high consideration costs invite inattention. Moreover, our simulations show that in such
a model, switching costs have to be unreasonably large to produce typically low switching
rates. Polyakova (2016) points out that including heterogeneity in these one-stage models
tends to bring down estimated switching costs. The two-stage model we propose achieves
this as well, with inattention to plan choice as a second source of inertia.
A few recent models of switching behavior in Medicare Part D and other markets allow
for both inattention and switching costs. While they share certain features of our model,
none comprises all of them.11 Kiss (2014) studies liability insurance switching in Hungary.
His specification of the attention stage is simpler than ours as he can rely on a natural
experiment that creates variation in the attention probability. Hortaçsu et al . (2017)
develop a model with attention and switching stages and use it to analyze inertia in the
Texas residential electricity market. Ho et al . (2017) is substantively related to the present
paper as they analyze inattention in Medicare Part D and discuss attention triggers. Their
model focuses on the implications of inertia for firm behavior. None of the above three
models allow unobserved heterogeneity that enters both stages. Finally, in recent work
Abaluck and Adams (2017) provide a theoretical foundation for models of plan choice with
inattention.12 Their empirical analysis uses data from Medicare Part D, and while their
empirical approach diﬀers from ours, their key results on the importance of inattention
are consistent with ours.
In order to characterize the individual and joint contributions of inattention, switching
costs, and acuity to the observed persistence of plan choices, we estimate our model in
five stages (I to V) by successively removing restrictions. The full model V provides
11 Our study and the papers cited in this paragraph introduce inattention in two-stage models of consumer
choice. Alternative but related motivations for introducing a first stage focus on decision costs. In a
study of retirement investment, Luco (2018) distinguishes between decision costs and enrollment costs.
The first-stage decision in Honka (2014) determines how many markets a consumers searches and thus
endogenizes the size of her consideration set.
12 There is a large and growing literature on rational inattention, see Gabaix (2017) for a review. Im-
plications for empirical models of discrete choice are studied by Matějka and McKay (2015), Abaluck
and Adams (2017), and Gibbard (2017), among others.
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the best fit of the data, and the restricted models are statistically rejected. In the full
model, we conclude that consumers are more likely to pay attention to plan choice if
overspending in the last year is more salient and if their old plan gets worse, for instance
due to premium increases. However, consumers are not more likely to pay attention when
they experience the onset of a chronic health condition that involves costly prescription
drugs, even though such an onset could make it worthwhile to search for a plan with a
more suitable formulary.
Our model allows us to compare two classes of potential interventions aimed at reducing
inertia. We simulate choices and overspending in counterfactual scenarios that force
attention and remove switching costs, respectively. Our overall conclusion is that policies
that increase attention, say by eliminating defaults or making them less automatic, or
by providing individualized plan comparisons to reduce consideration cost, are at least as
eﬀective as policies designed to reduce switching costs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We begin by describing the in-
stitutional arrangements of Medicare Part D that are relevant for our analysis and the
related literature on plan choice and plan switching in this and other markets in Section
2. Section 3 describes the data sources, the construction of our analytic dataset, and the
definitions of the model variables. It also reports some descriptive empirical facts about
plan switching in Medicare Part D which motivate the set-up of our two-stage discrete
choice model. This model is then introduced in Section 4. The estimation results are pre-
sented and discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, we report the results of our simulations
of counterfactual scenarios aimed at reducing inertia in the Medicare Part D market. In
Section 7, we summarize our findings and draw policy conclusions.
2 Background
2.1 Institutional framework of Medicare Part D
Medicare Part D, introduced in 2006, provides the Medicare-eligible population with
universal access to standardized, heavily subsidized prescription drug coverage through
government-approved plans sponsored by private insurance companies and health mainte-
nance organizations (HMOs). In addition to providing access to aﬀordable drug coverage
to all Medicare beneficiaries (in particular to the chronically ill), a second policy goal was
to create a “competitive, transparent marketplace oﬀering a wide array of benefits” (Bach
and McClellan (2005), p. 2733). The institutional design of Medicare Part D exemplifies
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the current trend toward “consumer-directed health care” (Goodman (2006)) as it relies
on consumer behavior and competition among insurers to attain satisfactory market out-
comes with limited government regulation. In the case of Medicare Part D, and arguably
also in other similar programs, giving consumers more choice also means confronting them
with diﬃcult decisions. In the following, we describe the features of the program that are
relevant for our present analysis.
Medicare beneficiaries can enroll in Part D when they become eligible for Medicare. If
they enroll, they can choose between about 50 plans (the exact number varies across
regions) that vary in monthly premium, the formulary benefit design, as well as the benefit
structure. Once enrolled, beneficiaries can switch to a new plan annually during the open
enrollment period at the end of each year. If individuals do not actively decide to switch to
a diﬀerent plan they are automatically re-enrolled in their old plan for the new year. The
menu of available plans is the same for first-time enrollees and switchers. Importantly,
plans might be taken oﬀ the market so that they are not available to enrollees for the
next year. In most cases, the plan sponsor transfers enrollees in such plans to diﬀerent
ones; these transfers are documented in “cross-walk” tables. Otherwise, enrollees will not
have a default plan.13 As we discuss later, we exploit this fact for identification.
Each firm that wants to enter this market has to oﬀer at least a plan that is actuarially
equivalent to a standard plan whose features are tightly specified. The standard plan is
defined in terms of the benefit structure, including specific values for the plan’s deductible
and two coverage thresholds that depend on the beneficiary’s annual pharmacy bill or the
beneficiary’s out-of-pocket (OOP) cost for drugs on the plan’s formulary. In 2006, the
first year of the Part D market, the standard Medicare Part D plan had the following
benefit structure:14
• The beneficiary has an annual deductible of $250.
• The beneficiary pays 25 percent of drug costs above $250 and up to $2,250 (the
“initial coverage limit” or ICL). For a beneficiary whose annual pharmacy bill has
reached $2,250, the OOP cost is then $750.
• The beneficiary pays 100 percent of drug costs above $2,250 and up to OOP cost
of $3,600; this is referred to as the coverage gap or donut hole. The threshold of
$3,600 is attained at a drug bill of $5,100.
13 See Hoadley et al . (2013) for further details.
14 In subsequent years, these numbers were adjusted for inflation, see for example Heiss et al . (2013).
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• The beneficiary pays 5 percent of drug costs above the drug cost threshold of $5,100;
this is referred to as catastrophic coverage.
The Medicare Part D plans sponsored by private insurance firms may diﬀer from the
standard plan, provided that their benefits for any drug costs are, on average, at least as
high as those of the standard plan. Enhancements may in particular include coverage for
the $250 deductible and for the gap in the standard plan.
This design implies that Medicare Part D stand-alone plans are characterized by the fol-
lowing variables: premium, deductible (if any), ICL for those plans that are not classified
as “standard benefit”, and the formulary benefit design which specifies drug tiers and co-
payments. Together with the specific prescription drugs an enrollee uses over the course
of the year, these characteristics determine her OOP cost. The sum of these OOP cost
and the premiums paid is the total cost to the consumer which for simplicity we refer to
as “total costs” in the following.
There are two institutional features that provide beneficiaries with easy access to infor-
mation on the plans that are available to them, and their cost implications: First, the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) provide an online deicsion tool, Plan
Finder, that gives the premium and out-of-pocket costs in all available plans, given the
individual’s current or anticipated list of prescriptions.15 Second, before the beginning of
the open enrollment period, each plan has to send a standardized “Plan Annual Notice
of Change” (ANOC) to its enrollees, based on a template provided by CMS. This notice
contains a table with cost-relevant plan features for the current and the following year
(premium, deductible, copayments) as well as detailed information on all changes that
will become eﬀective in January of the following year.16
2.2 Existing literature on plan choice and switching in Medicare Part D
Since its introduction in 2006, a large number of studies have examined the quality of
consumer decision-making in the Medicare Part D market. Early studies of enrollment
decisions and initial plan choices, such as Heiss et al . (2010) and Kling et al . (2012),
15 The CMS Plan Finder can be accessed at http://www.medicare.gov/find-a-plan/ (last visited: Septem-
ber 9, 2016). A limitation of Plan Finder is that while it suggests generic substitutes for an enrollee’s
branded drugs, it does not identify and provide convenient price information on branded therapeutic
substitutes that are less expensive in alternative plans, or calculate risks associated with new conditions
or complications, see Heiss et al . (2013).
16 A recent example of an ANOC can be found at https://www.yourmedicaresolutions.com/sites/
default/files/2015%20%20Standard%20ANOC.pdf (last visited: September 9, 2016).
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analyzed survey data and documented choices that seemed unlikely to be optimal, even
though initial enrollment rates were high and overall the introduction of Medicare Part D
was deemed to be successful; see Heiss et al . (2006), Goldman and Joyce (2008), Duggan
et al . (2008). More recent research uses much more detailed administrative data on
plan choices and prescription drug claims provided by CMS. A finding of several early
studies in this literature is that for substantial fractions of those enrolled in Part D, initial
plan choices imply overspending: For a given use of prescription drugs, plans with lower
total costs than that of the chosen plan exist, see Abaluck and Gruber (2011), Zhou
and Zhang (2012), and Heiss et al . (2013). For example, Heiss et al. document that in
2006–2009, less than a quarter of individuals were enrolled in plans that were, from an ex
ante viewpoint, as good as the least-cost plan covering the same drugs. Their estimates
indicate that consumers overspent about $300 per year, on average. Unobserved plan and
taste heterogeneity may explain some of the overspending documented in this and other
studies, but most likely not all of it.
Given that beneficiaries’ drug needs evolve over time and plan sponsors adjust key features
such as premiums and the formulary benefit design, and switching involves no out-of-
pocket monetary cost, the observed switching rates around 10 percent found by Heiss
et al . (2010) and Hoadley et al . (2013) are surprisingly low. A natural approach to assess
the eﬀect of inertia at the individual level is to check how overspending evolves over
time. Ketcham et al . (2012) find that enrollees were more likely to switch plans if their
potential gain from doing so was larger and that overall, large reductions in overspending
were realized from 2006 to 2007. In contrast, using the full universe of claims data that
became available subsequently, Abaluck and Gruber (2016a) find that forgone savings
from choosing suboptimal plans have increased during the first four years of Medicare
Part D. They argue that there has been little consumer learning over time in the Part D
market, and that increasing choice inconsistencies are driven by changes on the supply side
that are not oﬀset by consumers because of inertia. Relatedly, Abaluck et al . (2018) show
in a reduced-form analysis of Medicare Part D plan choices that small price elasticities,
substantial myopia, and excess sensitivity to salient plan characteristics impact choices
beyond their eﬀect on prices. As mentioned in the introduction, attributing the low
switching rate solely to switching costs gives implausibly high estimates of these costs.
For example, Miller and Yeo (2012) estimate switching costs around $1,700. Estimates
based on individual level data that allow for some heterogeneity tend to be smaller, but
still substantial; see Polyakova (2016) and Ketcham et al . (2015).
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Another dimension of consumer behavior in health insurance markets that has been stud-
ied using administrative data from Medicare Part D concerns enrollees’ reaction to non-
linearities in benefit schedule, particularly the out-of-pocket cost of drugs in the intial
coverage region, the gap, and the catastrophic region. Einav et al . (2015) show that
beneficiaries react to these nonlinearities by substituting drugs within and across years.
3 Data construction and descriptive evidence on plan switching
In our analysis of plan switching and inertia in Medicare Part D, we use the claims records
of a 20% representative sample of Medicare enrollees in the years 2007–2010. These claims
data have also been used by other researchers working on Medicare Part D plan choice
and switching, including Abaluck and Gruber (2011), Abaluck and Gruber (2016a), Heiss
et al . (2013), Hoadley et al . (2013), and Polyakova (2016). As in most of these earlier
studies, we restrict our analysis to the claims for beneficiaries aged at least 65, in stand-
alone prescription drug plans (PDPs) who do not receive low-income subsidies and are
not dual-eligible for Medicare and Medicaid.
The claims data allow identification of major attributes of available and chosen plans, such
as premium, deductibles, and gap coverage. However, plan identities were encrypted, so
that it was not possible in our construction to name the insurer and retrieve the plan’s
exact formulary. Therefore, we estimated the formularies of the encrypted plans from the
tiers and copayments of all drugs used in each plan by its enrollees from our sample. The
algorithm is detailed in Heiss et al . (2013); a similar approach has been used by other
researchers including Abaluck and Gruber (2016a).
Throughout the paper, we use the following convention for dating variables: Decisions
with respect to plans covering prescription drug use in year t are taken during the open
enrollment period at the end of year t 1. The plan in which a consumer is enrolled in
year t 1 is referred to as the “default plan”, the “old plan” or the “year t 1 plan”, and
the “new plan” is the one covering year t.
3.1 Sample
To study switching between Part D plans among seniors, we form working samples of Part
D enrollees who have unrestricted choice among all the plans available in their Medicare
region, and have suﬃcient data on their health, drug use, OOP costs, and premiums to
estimate our plan-choice models.
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The full 20% samples comprise between 9.3 and 10 million individuals per year, for the
four years 2007–2010. We restrict our analytic sample to those individuals who are U.S.
residents, aged 65 years or older, enrolled in stand-alone, non-employer (non-EGWP) Part
D prescription drug plans; are neither entitled to the Low-Income Subsidy (LIS) nor dual
eligible for Medicaid; are continuously enrolled in Part D in two adjacent years; and do
not switch plans during the year (outside of the open enrollment period).17
Applying these criteria results in sample sizes of around 1.2 million individuals for the
years 2008–2010 (Table 1). As we analyze plan choice for year t as made at the end of
year t 1, conditional on year t 1 information, we estimate our choice models for these
three years. The criteria for selecting individuals for our analytic sample are essentially
the same as those used by Heiss et al . (2013) and other studies of plan choice in Medicare
Part D. In the final step, we randomly select 100,000 individuals since the estimation of
our model is computationally intensive. The number of observations available for each
year is smaller (Table 1) as the resulting panel is unbalanced. The total number of choices
across all individuals and years is 234,455. All descriptive statistics and model estimates
reported in the remainder of the paper refer to this estimation sample, or to sub-samples
thereof.
3.2 Plan choice, prescription drug use, and individual characteristics
For our subsequent analysis, we construct various variables that measure individual char-
acteristics, health status, prescription drug use, and plan choice. These data are aug-
mented with data on the features of the available plans (which may vary every year) such
as premium and whether they provide gap coverage.
In addition, we construct cost variables based on the individual’s prescription drug use
during year t 1, i. e., the year at the end of which decisions for year t are made. The
list of all prescription drugs used combined with the formulary and benefit design of a
Part D plan and the plan’s premium gives the total costs of that plan, i. e., the sum of all
17 For those who are not in a stand-alone plan, we do not have data on individual prescription drug
claims. Eligibility for the LIS, in turn, changes the nature of the choice problem an individual faces
considerably, as discussed for instance by Decarolis (2015). These groups are commonly excluded in
recent studies of plan choice and switching behavior using claims data, as for instance in Ho et al .
(2017), Abaluck and Gruber (2016a), and Polyakova (2016). Similar to these studies, we do not adjust
for or estimate selection into (or out of) stand-alone PDP plans. There is an extensive and growing
literature focusing on selection in the Medicare context, mainly focusing on advantageous selection into
Medicare Advantage (for an overview see Newhouse and McGuire (2014)) and how insurers encourage
this type of selection, e.g. through advertising (Aizawa and Kim (2018)) or formulary design (Lavetti
and Simon (2018)).
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copayments, the premiums, and any deductibles. We construct total costs for year t for
the plan chosen in year t 1 and for any plan available in the next year.
We also construct variables that indicate whether according to her OOP costs, an individ-
ual (in her current year plan) ended up in the Part D catastrophic region, in the coverage
gap, or below the coverage gap.
Finally, we construct indicators for the incidence of new health conditions, classified by
whether they are costly in terms of prescription drugs or not. We classify conditions as
costly if having the specific condition predicts high prescription drug costs in supplemen-
tary regressions.18
The claims data contain no demographic information on the individual other than age,
sex, race, and geographic location. To close this gap we augment our data with regional
information from the American Community Survey (ACS): the ZIP-code share of individ-
uals aged 65 and above without a high school degree (“low education”) and the share of
the population aged 65 or above with income below the federal poverty level (FPL) (“low
income”) and above 5⇥ the FPL (“high income”).
Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported below in Section 5. In the remainder
of the present section, we discuss the choice and cost variables in more detail.
3.3 Individuals with and without a default plan
In our subsequent analysis, we distinguish individuals with and those without a default
plan: individuals whose choice set in t includes the plan that they were enrolled in in t 1–
as well as those whose t 1 plan left the market but was assigned a new plan for t by the
plan sponsor – have a default plan. If they do not take action, they will – by default –
stay in their old (or the designated default) plan. On the contrary, individuals without a
default are forced to pay attention to plan choice if they do not want to end up without
Part D coverage.
Individuals with a default plan either switch to a new plan or stay in the default –
typically the old one. Thus, every year, each individual falls into one of three groups:
without default plan, switcher, and stayer. Table 2 displays the shares of these groups.
18 Costly conditions include acute myocardial infarction, ischemic heart disease, stroke, breast and lung
cancer, Alzheimer’s disease and dementia, diabetes, depression and asthma. In comparison to these
conditions, hip fracture, prostate cancer, endometrial cancer, colorectal cancer, chronic obstructive pul-
monary disease, chronic kidney disease, osteoporosis, heart failure, rheumatoid arthritis/osteoarthritis,
glaucoma, anemia, benign prostatic hyperplasia, hyperlipidemia, acquired hypothyroidism, hyperten-
sion, atrial fibrillation are relatively cheap and thus included as “cheap” conditions.
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The majority of individuals with default ends up staying in their default plan. On average
across all three years, only a little more than 10% of the individuals with default plan
switch plans. On average, and across all years, about 3.4% of individuals do not have
a default plan and are thus forced to make a plan choice. The majority of them do not
have a default plan because they are new to Medicare Part D (97%). Only 3% have been
enrolled in a t 1 plan that is no longer available in year t and was not mapped to a new
plan by its sponsor.19 Despite some diﬀerences in sample definitions, these numbers are
in line with those reported in an extensive descriptive analysis of administrative data on
Medicare Part D plan switching between 2006 and 2010 by Hoadley et al . (2013).
3.4 Total costs and overspending
To motivate our analysis of inertia in Medicare Part D plan choices and the eﬀect of
interventions to reduce it, we now present descriptive evidence on the quality of plan
choices of individuals without default plan, switchers and stayers. In the literature on
plan-choice quality in Medicare Part D, and in health insurance more generally, a measure
of overspending is frequently used for this purpose, see Abaluck and Gruber (2011), Heiss
et al . (2013), and Abaluck and Gruber (2016a). Conceptually, overspending is defined
as the diﬀerence between the total costs (to the consumer) of the plan a consumer has
chosen and the total costs of the least-cost alternative. This definition reflects the fact
that relevant features of the plans such as premiums, deductibles, the plan formulary and
copayments are summarized in the total costs.
In practice, measures of total costs and overspending can be constructed in diﬀerent ways.
A key distinction is that between an ex ante and an ex post perspective. Tables 3 and 4
display ex post and ex ante measures of total costs and of overspending for individuals
without a default plan and those with a default overall and separately for stayers and
switchers.
Ex post overspending for year t is calculated based on the prescription drugs that an
individual has taken in that year. It thus reflects the costs that beneficiaries actually
realized during year t. As Table 3 shows, individuals who stay in their default plan have
the highest overspending, on average, compared to both switchers and individuals without
a default plan. This is true in absolute values as well as when looking at overspending
relative to total costs. These numbers might be taken to imply that actively making
19 This low share is inline with Hoadley et al . (2013) who note that these situations have occurred
relatively rarely. In most cases when plans left the market, they were mapped to a diﬀerent plan as
designated default by the plan sponsor.
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decisions results in better outcomes. This is not what one would expect if individuals
stayed in their default plans because of a preference for unobserved plan characteristics.
Individuals without a default plan do not choose quite as well as those who actively decide
to switch to a diﬀerent plan, which indicates substantial heterogeneity in the ability to
choose plans. This implies that switchers are a selected group of individuals who appear
to make better choices than individuals without a default plan who, in turn, are mostly
newly enrolled.
In Table 4, we turn to ex ante overspending for stayers and switchers, which is based on
prescription drugs taken in year t 1 (this measure cannot be computed for the newly
enrolled individuals, as their prescriptions for t 1 are not observed). This measure is
meant to capture beneficiaries’ information on their prescription drug needs at the time
when they make their plan choice. This is also the information beneficiaries are asked
to provide to the Medicare Plan Finder. The table shows ex ante overspending in year
t for the plan that individuals chose for year t as well as for the default plan. For the
group of stayers, the two plans are obviously the same. For the switchers, overspending
based on the default plan is the amount they would have overspent had they stayed in
their default. The diﬀerence in overspending between the default and new plans thus
captures how much switchers have saved by switching plans – $180 per year, on average.
Compared to stayers, switchers’ overspending in the default plan is slightly higher in all
years except for 2010. This suggests that high ex ante overspending in the default plan
may encourage individuals to switch to a diﬀerent plan.
A particularly interesting group of individuals are those who have chosen the ex ante
cost-minimizing plan. As discussed in Heiss et al . (2013), this is the choice implied by
static optimization. It can easily be implemented, for instance by using a decision aid
such as the Medicare Plan Finder discussed above. The lower panel of Table 4 displays
the share of individuals with zero ex ante overspending, separately for the stayers and
switchers. A much larger share of switchers than stayers have zero ex ante overspending.
These numbers also support the notion that switchers make better choices than stayers.
In the structural model of plan choice presented in the remainder of this paper, we take an
ex post perspective. We cannot use the ex ante measures because they are not available
for the individuals without a default plan. Ex post measures of overspending might seem
problematic as they condition on information on outcomes, realized during year t, that
are not known to the individual at the end of year t 1. Using these measures is akin to
assuming perfect foresight (Heiss et al . (2013)). Ex ante measures, in contrast, do not
condition on year t outcomes but require assumption on how individuals form expectations
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at the end of year t 1 with respect to these variables. These assumption can also be
problematic. We discussed the trade-oﬀ between using ex ante and ex post measures
in detail in earlier work, see Heiss et al . (2013). To the extent that individuals have
more information on the future development of their drug use than just the drugs used
in t 1, ex post drug cost might even be a better measure of their expectations than ex
ante measures. In our analysis of static Medicare Part D choices, we found that the key
substantive findings do not depend on whether ex ante or ex post measures are used.
4 A two-stage model of plan-switching decisions
In this section, we introduce a comprehensive model of plan selection that is behaviorally
more plausible and can explain more of the empirical findings presented in Section 3 than
typical models used in the literature; Figure 1 provides a schematic overview. The model
includes two features that have not been combined in previous papers.
First, our model comprises separate attention and plan-choice stages. Attention is trig-
gered by events known to the consumer before the open enrollment period, such as onset
of new health conditions, announcement of premium or formulary changes of the old
plan. Plan choice requires attention, and is influenced by the future expected benefits
and costs of alternative plans, as well as the cost of switching from the default plan. The
attention stage excludes information on new plan features that are unavailable to the inat-
tentive consumer, while the plan-choice stage excludes past triggering information that
is irrelevant to future plan choice. These are the behavioral foundations of the exclusion
restriction that identifies the two stages.
Second, our model allows for unobserved heterogeneity in the ability and willingness to
incur the consideration costs of diligent decisions; we call this latent factor acuity. Persons
may have low acuity because they have diﬃculty processing information and making
decisions or because the opportunity costs of careful decision making in this situation are
high.20 Acuity aﬀects both stages, allowing for the possibility that individuals who are
attentive make more careful choices than the average. To identify switching costs in the
second stage, we assume that enrollees with and without a default plan have the same
distribution of preferences, conditioned on acuity.
Below, we first describe the structure of the choice problem in Section 4.1. The concept of
acuity is introduced in Section 4.2. Then we discuss the two stages of the choice model in
20 Distinguishing between these various factors would require a structural model for acuity and data on
factors that influence opportunity cost; this is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Sections 4.3 and 4.4. In Section 4.5, we describe how various sets of parameter restrictions
give rise to simpler versions of this quite comprehensive choice model, some of which have
been studied in the earlier literature on inertia. We refer to the full model as Model V;
the restricted versions are labeled Model I–IV. The identification of the full Model V is
discussed in Section 4.6. Since inattention is unobserved and acuity enters both stages
simultaneously as a latent variable, all model parameters have to be estimated jointly. We
use a maximum likelihood estimator with a numerical approximation of the analytically
unavailable likelihood function; details are discussed in Section 4.7.
4.1 Structure of the choice problem
We model the plan choice for a set of consumers i = 1, . . . , N for years t = 1, . . . , T .21
Since the individuals start enrolling in Part D in diﬀerent years, can die during the time
our panel data covers, or can change the low-income subsidy status or other criteria
for inclusion in our estimation sample discussed in Section 3.1, our panel data set is
unbalanced and T diﬀers by individual. For notational convenience, we do not explicitly
index T by i in the remainder of this section. Individual i chooses among the plans
available to her for year t. The number of plans and their features diﬀer by year and
Medicare region, so the choice set varies over time and across individuals. We index the
plans in an individual’s choice set by j 2 Yit.
4.2 Acuity
Individuals diﬀer in both their ability and their willingness to put eﬀort into and incur-
ring the consideration cost of making good plan-choice decisions. We introduce a latent
variable, acuity, that captures these aspects. Acuity may comprise such diverse factors as
intelligence, financial literacy, mental health, opportunity costs of time, or the availability
of support from children, doctors, or other sources. It can aﬀect choices in both stages:
Individuals with high levels of acuity might be more likely to pay attention in the first
stage of the model, i. e., they collect and compare information on the available plans.
If they do pay attention, acuity might also aﬀect the weight they put on plan features,
including the objective cost consequences such as their premiums and implied OOP costs,
and the error variance in the second stage (the multinomial choice model).
21 The time index t refers to the year for which the plan is chosen. The actual choice is made in the open
enrollment period at the end of the previous year.
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Acuity qit of individual i at time t is a latent variable that depends on observed individual
characteristics wit. We include variables such as age, gender, depression, and ZIP-code
level socio-economic characteristics. Acuity also includes a time-constant unobserved
heterogeneity term ci:
qit = wit↵+ ci (1)
We normalize the elements of wit such that qit has a mean of zero. We further assume that
ci is normally distributed with mean zero; its variance,  2c , will be estimated. Furthermore,
we denote with q⇤it acuity, standardized to have a mean of zero and a variance of one.
4.3 Attention stage
Let ait denote an unobserved indicator for whether individual i pays attention at time t
(ait = 1) or not (ait = 0). Individuals who are inattentive always stay in their default
plan. Some individuals are forced to pay attention and choose a plan, for example in the
first year of enrollment or if a plan is discontinued without a cross-walk to a new default.
While attention is unobserved, the dummy variable fit which is equal to one if individual i
is forced to make a choice as she has no default plan at time t is observed in the data. For
individuals with a default plan (fit = 0), we model the attention probability as a function
of observable attention triggers, collected in the vector xit, and unobserved individual
acuity qit from equation (1).
Whether individual i pays attention in choice situation t is determined by a latent propen-
sity, a⇤it. We use a linear specification
a⇤it = xit⇣ + qit + eit. (2)
The scale of latent acuity, qit, is identified by including it additively in (2). Individuals
with default plan pay attention if a⇤it is positive while individuals without a default always
pay attention. Assuming i.i.d. logistic errors eit, this implies a conditional attention
probability of
pait(ci) ⌘ Pr(ait = 1|fit,xit,wit; ci) =
8<: 11+exp( xit⇣ qit) if fit = 01 if fit = 1 (3)
4.4 Plan-choice stage
The plan-choice stage is specified as a generalized multinomial logit model with mixed
(i. e., random) parameters and heteroskedasticity, building on McFadden (1974) and Mc-
Fadden and Train (2000). The parameters of all plan characteristics may vary with the
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individual’s acuity (which also appears in the attention equation, as described above).22
Given an individual pays attention, she compares the plans j in her choice set Yit accord-
ing to their perceived utilities
uitj = zitj it +  ityit 1j + vitj. (4)
We first discuss how the eﬀects of the plan characteristics, collected in the vector zitj,
are modeled. We allow all parameters  it associated with the plan characteristics to
depend on acuity qit, i. e., they vary across individuals i and choice situations t. We
divide the plan characteristics, zitj, into two groups that diﬀer in their parameterization.
For the coeﬃcients associated with price characteristics (premium and OOP costs), we
impose a negativity constraint for all acuity levels.23 The signs of the coeﬃcients of the
other characteristics remain unconstrained. Indexing the plan characteristics by k, their
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(5)
where  (·) denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. In order to facilitate the
interpretation of the size of the non-cost coeﬃcients, we use standardized acuity,  (q⇤it).
This specification implies that these parameter values are bounded between  0k (for very
low acuity) and  0k +  
q
k (for very high acuity).
The lagged dependent variable yit 1j indicates the default plan, i.e., the plan in which
individual i is enrolled in year t  1 or the plan that the individual’s t  1 plan was
cross-walked to. Thus, yit 1j = 0 is associated with a switch; a value of 1 indicates
that individual i’s chosen plan j is the same as the default plan. As in prior literature,
the coeﬃcient of the lagged dependent variable,  it, is interpreted as reflecting switching
costs. We allow for the possibility that switching costs vary across individuals and may
also depend on acuity. Thus, the most general specification is
 it =  
0 +  q  (q⇤it) +  i (6)
22 In an earlier version if this paper, Heiss et al . (2016), the most general model we described and
estimated only allowed for the variance of the error term to vary with acuity whereas the parameters
of the plan characteristics were fixed.
23 Specifications without the explicit restriction of negative cost coeﬃcients had a worse model fit. More-
over, cost coeﬃcients with a positive density in a neighborhood of zero create problems of interpretation
and for the calculation of willingness to pay; see McFadden and Robles (2019).
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We allow individual acuity to aﬀect choices in the sense that individuals with higher values
of q⇤it give relatively more weight to utility contributions of observed plan characteristics
and the switching cost. Those with lower values of q⇤it are relatively more aﬀected by the
noise involved in the error terms. Thus, vitj =  itv˜itj, where v˜itj is an Extreme Value
Type I random variable. The error term of the choice model is heteroscedastic, and we




With a plan-choice parameterization resembling a heteroscedastic mixed multinomial logit
model, the conditional probability that individual i chooses plan j from choice set Yit at
time t given she pays attention is












This choice model incorporates the possibility that individuals with default plan who end
up paying attention have a relatively high acuity and therefore tend to pick “good” plans
with low total costs. We have seen a first indication of this eﬀect in Section 3.4 where
we reported that switchers have a lower realized overspending than individuals without a
default plan. Ignoring this eﬀect would lead to biases in the policy conclusions. Specif-
ically, if active choices are observed only for a selected group of high-acuity individuals,
simpler models would overestimate the gain from reductions in inattention and switching
costs as they cannot predict the behavior of the full population using the estimates of a
selected population without adjusting for the acuity diﬀerences.
We end this section by discussing how our model captures inertia. At the end of a year,
an individual may stay in her default plan for three reasons. First, she is inattentive and
so she stays in her default plan. Second, she is attentive, realizes that there is a better
plan but does not switch because of switching costs. Third, she is attentive and decides
that her default plan is the best option. Importantly, not all individuals that stay in the
default plan do so because of inertia. Inertia reflects only the first two reasons. Our model
allows us to quantify these channels.
As a thought experiment, we can compare the probability of staying in the default plan
to that of switching to an otherwise identical plan. We use the diﬀerence between these
two probabilities to quantify inertia in the empirical analysis below.
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4.5 Alternative model specifications
The general model presented in the previous sections nests several special cases that have
been studied in prior literature. These special cases are obtained by restricting parameters
of the general model to zero. We specify and estimate five increasingly complex versions.
The behavioral features of these models are described, together with the associated pa-
rameter restrictions, in Table 5.
Model I, the standard model in the literature, consists only of a choice stage; it is a stan-
dard mixed (random parameters) multinomial logit model with heterogeneous switching
costs. The only free parameters are  0, µ ,  2 ; all others are restricted to zero. As dis-
cussed in Section 2, the coeﬃcient of a dummy variable for the default plan has been
interpreted as a measure of switching costs in earlier literature. Importantly, this simple
model attributes all inertia to switching costs.
In Model II, we add an attention stage and thus allow for inattention as an additional
source of inertia. The attention stage includes acuity, a latent measure of decision-making
competence modeled as a function of observable characteristics, associated with parameter
vector ↵ and attention triggers with the parameter vector ⇣. Model III adds unobserved
heterogeneity in the equation for the latent acuity variable, with estimated standard
deviation  c.
Model IV further allows for an eﬀect of acuity on plan choice, conditional on attention,
which introduces heteroskedasticity at the plan-choice stage. In other words, individuals’
plan choices vary not only with observed plan characteristics and switching costs, but also
with their acuity. The parameter ⌘ captures this eﬀect. We expect that individuals with
higher levels of acuity tend to make better plan-choice decisions (⌘ < 0).
Finally, Model V corresponds to the full two-stage model described above; in addition to
Model IV it includes interactions of the coeﬃcients of the plan characteristics with acuity,
captured by the parameter vector  qit.
When estimating the restricted models I through IV, the parameters are optimized to
best explain the observed patterns such as inertia in choices. For example, in Model IV
heterogeneity is suppressed in switching costs but not in the attention stage. Therefore,
some of the non-switching observed in the data that would be attributed to switching
costs in the full model is captured by the attention stage in the restricted model.
Given the nested parametric structure of the full model, we can test the behavioral re-
strictions implied by Models I–IV. The results are reported together with measures of
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model fit in Section 5.2 below. To preview our findings, the more flexible models tend to
fit the data better and they produce more realistic estimates of switching costs.
4.6 Identification
Data on repeated plan choices reveal whether a beneficiary switches plans for the next
period. The identification problem arises because if she does not switch, we do not observe
the reason why.
The simplest explanation for why a beneficiary decides to stay in the default plan is that
she carefully compared plans and came to the conclusion that her default plan is the most
attractive one available for the next year, t. Given that on average around 50 plans are
available and that both the list of available plans and their features (like the premium,
deductible, list of covered drugs, copayments and others) change on a yearly basis, this
alone is unlikely to explain the low switching rates observed in the data. We are able to
account for a large part of the plan characteristics that should be relevant to an individual
who chooses an insurance plan to minimize total costs. We observe exactly which drugs
an individual takes and can reconstruct the financial consequences of buying these drugs
under each available plan, as reflected in our total cost measure. We also account for
specific plan features such as the premium and deductible as well as the risk associated
with each plan. On top of that, we include alternative-specific constants for the largest
plans. Allowing for preference heterogeneity provides a comprehensive model of deliberate
plan choices. The remaining persistence that cannot be explained by plan features and
preference heterogeneity is what we call inertia and attribute to inattention and switching
costs.
For identification, we can exploit the fact that some individuals are forced to make an
active choice because they enter the market for the first time or their t 1 plan is discon-
tinued without a cross-walk to a new default. For similar arguments, see Handel (2013),
Handel and Kolstad (2015) and others. These individuals by definition do not have the
opportunity to be inattentive. If they are otherwise comparable to the other consumers
and have the same distribution of preferences – conditional on acuity – their behavior
alone identifies the plan choice parameters and the diﬀerence to the individuals with de-
fault plans is attributed to inertia. As individuals with and without default plan have
similar means of the observed variables (in particular age, education, and poverty rate; see
Table 6 below), the assumption of similar preferences across the two groups, particularly
when conditioned on acuity, seems reasonable. Also, they are very similar in terms of the
choice sets they face; see Table 7 below.
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The explanatory variables that drive the attention probability and the plan choices are
diﬀerent in a quite natural fashion, creating exclusion restrictions that add to the iden-
tification of the model. Take the premium as an example. If the premium of the t 1
plan increases in t – a change that is made salient in the ANOC letter – our model im-
plies that attention is triggered and the individual starts to compare alternatives. If on
the other hand the level of the premium of the t 1 plan is high for year t relative to
the alternatives – a fact that is only apparent after comparing plans – this might con-
tribute to overcoming switching costs and changing the plan. The same holds for the
other predictors. Attention is triggered by diﬀerent shocks or changes in the past – we
use experience with Part D in t 1, changes of the t 1 plan – including whether it was
cross-walked (consolidated) to a diﬀerent plan, and health shocks and health care use in
t 1, see Table 6 – , whereas for the plan choice, comparison to the other plans provide
the relevant predictors. Importantly, in this market attention triggers such as changes in
the old (t 1) plan’s premium and other features are highly salient as the ANOC letters
prominently contain pairwise comparisons of the old and new values of plan features, see
also Ho et al . (2017). The assumption that changes in state variable trigger attention
is also in line with theoretical models of inattention such as Bordalo et al . (2013). In a
study of Medicare Part D choices that is comparable to ours, Abaluck and Adams (2017)
test the exclusion restriction that characteristic levels impact utility while characteristic
changes conditional on levels impact only attention, and they find it “roughly statisfied”
(p. 36).24
A final identification issue arises in dynamic panel data models with lagged dependent
variables if unobserved initial conditions and unobserved heterogeneity are correlated, see
Heckman (1981). In principle, we could include initial choices for everyone in our sample
as we observe Part D plan choice since the program’s introduction in 2006. However,
as discussed in Heiss et al . (2010) and Heiss et al . (2013), the choice situation faced by
consumers in the first year of Medicare Part D was special due to an extended enrollment
period which ended in May as well as not fully functioning decision aids such as Plan
Finder. We therefore opted against including the data from the first year.
24 We have also estimated the model relaxing the exclusion restrictions by including experiences with
Part D in t 1 and health care use in t 1 in the acuity equation (1). The results (available from the
authors upon request), are very similar.
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4.7 Maximum likelihood estimation
Given our parametric specification, we can estimate all model parameters simultaneously
using maximum likelihood. For notational convenience, we collect all parameters in the
vector ✓; for an overview, see Table 5. Since we assume independence across individuals,
the likelihood function is the product of the individual likelihood contributions Li(✓).
The observed outcome for individual i is the sequence of plan choices made in years
t = 1, . . . , T (while attention is unobserved). Let jit denote the observed plan choice in
year t. Thus, the likelihood contribution is given by
Li(✓) = Pr(yi1 = ji1, . . . , yiT = jiT |✓,di) , (10)
where for notational convenience, di collects the histories of the observed covariates wit,
xit, and zit. Further, conditional on these covariates as well as individual i’s unobserved
acuity ci and her time-constant switching cost component  i, her choices are independent
over time. Put diﬀerently, any observed dependence is due to these two latent character-
istics, conditional on observables. We can therefore write
Pr(yi1 = ji1, . . . , yiT = jiT |✓,di, ci,  i) =
TY
t=1
Pr(yit = jit|✓,di, yit 1, ci,  i) . (11)
These probabilities are readily available given our assumptions on the attention and plan-
choice stages. We first obtain the choice probabilities for period t:
Pr(yit = jit|✓,di, yit 1, ci,  i) = pait(ci) · Pr(yit = j|ait = 1,di, yit 1, ci,  i)
+ (1  pait(ci)) · Pr(yit = j|ait = 0,di, yit 1, ci,  i)(12)
This expression involves probabilities that condition on attention, which is not observ-
able. By plugging in the quantities derived in (3) and (9) above, we see that the choice
probabilities have diﬀerent forms depending on whether the individual has a default plan
or not and whether she stays in the default plan or switches to a diﬀerent plan, which are
both observable events. For individuals without a default plan (fit = 1), the attention
probability is pait(ci) = 1. If individuals with default plan (fit = 0) do not pay attention,
the probability of choosing a diﬀerent than the default plan (i. e., yit 1jit 6= jit), is zero,
the probability of choosing the default plan is one.
Putting everything together, for any plan j 2 Yit, we get
Pr(yit = j| · , ci,  i) =
8>>><>>>:
pyitj(ci,  i) if fit = 1
pait(ci) · pyitj(ci,  i) if fit = 0 ^ yit 1 6= j
pait(ci) · pyitj(ci,  i) + (1  pait(ci)) if fit = 0 ^ yit 1 = j
(13)
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To obtain the probability of individual i’s entire choice sequence, we plug this expression
into equation (11). To calculate the likelihood contribution, the final step is to integrate
out the remaining two latent quantities, ci and  i:
Pr(yi1 = ji1, . . . , yiT = jiT | · ) =
Z Z TY
t=1
Pr(yit = jit| · , c,  ) g(c)h( ) dc d  , (14)
where g(·) and h(·) are the densities of c and  , respectively. Both latent variables are
assumed to follow a normal distribution. Recall that we impose the normalization that
c is standard normally distributed, whereas mean and variance of the normal variate  
are left unrestricted. The double integral does not have an analytic solution. We use a
Gaussian quadrature product rule to accurately approximate it.25
5 Results
In this section, we present the main empirical results. We begin by providing descriptive
statistics of the observed covariates and choice outcomes. We then present the parameter
estimates of our choice model, focusing on the most comprehensive specification (Model
V), and interpret these results in terms of the implied marginal eﬀects. We end the section
by comparing these results with those obtained from estimating the simpler nested Models
I–IV.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 6 contains descriptive statistics of the covariates that enter the acuity equation
and the attention stage, separately for individuals with and without a default plan and
stratified by switching status. The top panel shows variables that are potential triggers
of attention. As most of the individuals without a default newly enter Medicare Part D,
the attention trigger variables that refer to information in t 1 are not available for them.
The attention trigger variables are thus not shown for individuals without a default. The
bottom panel of this table shows demographic controls that may aﬀect individuals’ acuity
when making Part D choices.
There are three diﬀerent sets of attention triggers: (1) experience in Part D in year t 1,
(2) changes in features of the year t 1 plan, and (3) health shocks and prescription drug
25 With an even more flexible model including several random parameters, the dimension of this integral
would increase and product rule Gaussian quadrature would become infeasible. However, in that case it
could be approximated using either Monte-Carlo simulation or powerful multidimensional integration
rules such as sparse grids, see Heiss and Winschel (2008).
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use in year t 1. The descriptive statistics suggest that Part D experience and changes
in the old plan may be particularly relevant triggers: while among those who decide to
switch plans 23% were in the coverage gap in year t 1, only 18% among stayers hit the
gap. Similarly, switchers face an average premium increase of $130 per year while stayers
only face an average increase of $70. 15% of switchers see changes in cost sharing, either
from coinsurance to copayment or vice versa, compared to only 8% among stayers.
With respect to the variables that enter the acuity equation, switchers and stayers appear
to be rather similar. A small diﬀerence is observed in the fraction of non-whites, which
is 5% among switchers and 7% among stayers. As most individuals without a default
plan are newly enrolled in Medicare Part D, it is not surprising that these individuals
are younger, more likely to be male (which is correlated with age), and have fewer years
of experience with Part D than individuals with a default. With respect to all other
demographic variables, the two groups are very similar.
Table 7 compares plan characteristics in the choice sets faced by the individuals in the
estimation sample, again for individuals with and without a default plan and separately by
switching status. Overall, the choice sets seem to be very similar across the three groups
of individuals. On average, they can choose among roughly 52 plans, with very similar
average premiums, deductibles, ICLs, and gap coverage. The last plan characteristic is
the variance of the OOP costs on the plan level. This measure is meant to capture the
variability of costs that consumers can expect with each plan. Including the plan-level
variance of OOP as a regressor allows risk preferences to play a role.
Coming back to our discussion of identification in Section 4.6 above, these descriptive
findings are reassuring for two reasons. First, if individuals without a default were very
diﬀerent from those with default plan, it would be questionable whether individuals with-
out default can help to identify preferences for plan characteristics for those with default
plan. Second, the choice sets that the two groups face are similar on average, i. e., condi-
tional on attention the groups face similar choices, except that the default plan is included
in the choice set for those with default plan.
5.2 Main estimation results
As all models are estimated by Maximum Likelihood, their predictive power can be readily
assessed and compared. Table 8 reports the values of the Akaïke and Bayesian information
criteria (AIC and BIC) as well as the likelihood-ratio test statistics for pairwise compar-
isons to Model V. According to both the AIC and the BIC, Model V fits the data best,
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and the LR tests clearly reject the simpler models as well. Thus, the most comprehensive
Model V is our preferred model. In this subsection, we present the estimation results
obtained using Model V and discuss their substantive interpretation.26
Table 9 displays the estimates of the parameters of the attention stage, equation (2), and
of the acuity equation (1). Table 10 shows those for the plan-choice stage, equation (5).
These tables also show the implied marginal eﬀects of the covariates. For the attention
stage and the acuity equation, we calculate the marginal eﬀect on the probability of paying
attention as well as on the probability of switching plans. For the plan-choice stage, we
calculate the marginal eﬀect on the probability of choosing a plan conditional on attention
as well as overall (i. e., not conditioning on attention).
Attention stage
Recall that attention is a latent binary outcome. Our model estimates imply a mean
attention probability of 32 percent. The attention probability varies with observed co-
variates and it is also heterogeneous conditional on these covariates. We discuss the eﬀects
of observed covariates first and return to conditional heterogeneity below.
The attention trigger variables fall into three groups: experience in Part D in t 1, changes
in the features of the t 1 plan announced for year t, and health shocks as well as health-
care use in t 1. As Table 9 shows, the coeﬃcients of all experience variables and several
of those in the other two groups are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Despite the
large sample size, some of the health variables are not significant; they do not seem to
raise enrollees’ awareness of the opportunity to switch plans. In the following, we discuss
the eﬀect sizes of these covariates in terms of their marginal eﬀects on the probability
of attention. Table 9 also reports marginal eﬀects on switching. As switching requires
attention, the marginal eﬀects of the covariates on switching are always smaller than those
on attention.
Perhaps the most salient aspect of an individual’s Part D experience is whether she hit
the coverage gap and if so, whether she was enrolled in a plan that provides gap coverage.
We thus include two dummy variables and their interaction. The marginal eﬀect of having
gap coverage in year t 1 for individuals who did not hit the gap in t 1 is  13.8 percentage
points. For those who did hit the gap in t 1, it is 6.7 percentage points smaller, for a
total eﬀect of  20.5 percentage points. This is a large eﬀect: Individuals who hit the
gap and do have gap coverage are much less likely to even consider switching for year t.
Having hit the gap without gap coverage in year t 1 increases the attention probability
26 The estimation results for the other four models can be found in Tables A1 to A7 in the Appendix.
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by 14.8 percentage points, which also is a sizeable eﬀect. Similarly, individuals who have
hit the catastrophic coverage region in t 1, i. e., those with the largest drug bills, are
more likely to be attentive as well (by 3.9 percentage points).
As plans are required to send their enrollees ANOC letters before the open enrollment
period each year, all changes of the features of the year t  1 plan should be salient.
We find that individuals indeed are more likely to pay attention if the premium of their
old plan increases, the deductible increases, the ICL increases, their old plan introduces
changes to the formulary that would lead to an increase in OOP cost, or their old plan
switches from copayments to coinsurance or vice versa. For instance, an increase of the
year t 1 premium by 100 dollars results in a 10.4 percentage point increase of the attention
probability. Interestingly, we find that premium changes are particularly salient, as the
eﬀect of a premium increase is much higher than the eﬀects of an increase in the deductible
or the annual OOP spending implied by a formulary change. The finding that individuals
put more weight on premiums than on the cost implications of other plan features is in
line with earlier research, including Abaluck and Gruber (2011) and Heiss et al . (2013).
Furthermore, we find that the eﬀect of the implied change in OOP cost due to formulary
changes is much smaller (0.9 percentage point increase with a 100 dollar increase in OOP),
than the eﬀect of a change in the premium or the deductible. This likely reflects that
cost consequences of formulary changes are less salient than changes in premium and
deductible.27
Attention probabilities are higher if a t 1 plan is consolidated and if there is a change in
cost-sharing (from copay to coinsurance and vice versa). Such changes might make a plan
more or less attractive, so we do not have a strong prior on the sign of these eﬀects. An
increase of the ICL (as a higher limit indicates that the plan gets better) and a lower share
of tiers with increases in cost-sharing have insignificant or very small eﬀects. However,
as the regression already controls for the change in total OOP spending, these eﬀects are
not straightforward to interpret.
One would expect that having been diagnosed with a new health condition that is costly
in terms of prescription drugs or having had emergency room visits or hospital stays in
the year t 1 raises attention to the Medicare Part D decision. However, this is not borne
out by the data. The variables that measure health shocks and health-care use are mostly
statistically insignificant or have small eﬀects. However, we find a statistically significant
27 While the ANOC letters contain summary tables on changes in premiums, deductibles and copayments,
the exact formulary changes, i. e., changes in the list of drugs and their tiers, are only provided in an
appendix to the letter.
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but small eﬀect of a dummy variable for whether an individual had five doctor visits or
more in the previous year. As the model controls for the other health variables, this
finding suggests that repeated interaction with a health professional raises attention. The
data do not allow us to pursue such potential information channels further.
Acuity equation
An important determinant of attention is acuity – a latent variable that captures how
careful individuals are in making their choices. It is modeled as a function of observable
individual characteristics and an unobserved heterogeneity term. As the log likelihood
values and the information criteria in Table 8 show, including acuity in the model improves
predictive power considerably.
The structure of Model V allows us to characterize the association between acuity and
attention. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the estimated individual-level attention
probability (given the values of all other variables), stratified by decile of acuity. The
median attention probability for individuals in the lowest acuity decile is about 12 percent
whereas for those in the top acuity decile it is above 50 percent.
The bottom panel of Table 9 shows the coeﬃcients of the observable characteristics in
the acuity equation as well as their marginal eﬀects on attention and switching. The
coeﬃcient estimates imply higher levels of acuity for females, whites, younger individuals,
individuals who have less experience with Part D, individuals who live in ZIP code areas
with higher average education among seniors, those living in middle-income ZIP codes,
and those who have no depression diagnosis in their claims history.
We comment on the implied marginal eﬀects of these covariates on attention in turn.28
Beginning with the socio-demographic characteristics, the diﬀerence in acuity between
males and females is small. The eﬀect of being non-white is larger, with an implied
marginal eﬀect on attention of about 3 percentage points. (This estimate obviously also
captures the eﬀects of any unobserved individual characteristics that are correlated with
race.) Acuity declines with age. Relative to the base category (69 or younger) those in
the oldest age category (80 years or older) have an implied attention probability that is
lower by 2.9 percentage points.
An important issue in the literature on Medicare Part D is whether choices improve over
time as consumers learn to navigate this rather complicated market. The prior literature
on this question delivered mixed results, see Ketcham et al . (2012) and Abaluck and
28 As mentioned before, the marginal eﬀects of switching are smaller and we do not not discuss them
separately.
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Gruber (2016a). We find that for each additional year an individual has been enrolled
in Part D, the attention probability is reduced by 0.8 percentage points, ceteris paribus.
The fact that individuals become less attentive to plan switching over time, conditional on
all other variables including attention triggers, suggests that individuals’ decision-making
does not improve over time – rather, acuity declines.
It would be interesting to test whether acuity is predicted by measures of cognitive ability,
decision making competence, or financial literacy, see for example Barcellos et al . (2014).
Measures of these constructs are not available in the Medicare claims data. However, the
attention probability of individuals who have been diagnosed with depression is lower by
1 percentage point. This partial measure of mental health, which might also be related to
decision making competence, predicts at least part of the heterogeneity in Medicare Part
D decision-making (controlling for several other predictors).
The proxies for socio-economic status, constructed at the ZIP code level, also predict
acuity and therefore attention. An increase of the share of seniors without a high-school
degree by 1 percentage point is associated with a decrease in the attention probability of
0.065 percentage points. As ZIP code level income measures, we include the shares of poor
(income below the FPL) and rich (income above 500% of the FPL) seniors. Attention
probabilities are largest for the reference group of individuals with incomes between 100%
and 500% of the FPL, as the poor and rich shares increase by 1 percentage point, attention
probabilities decline by 0.025 and 0.09 percentage points, respectively. As these ZIP-code
level measures are noisy, the relatively small magnitudes of the marginal eﬀects are not
surprising. Nevertheless, they suggest that socio-economic status might play a role in
determining the quality of Medicare Part D plan choices. We speculate that the relatively
poor show lower levels of acuity because of lower decision-making competence. Among
the relatively rich, acuity might be lower because they feel less inclined to worry about
plan choice in Part D, which in turn might reflect their opportunity cost of time. This
interpretation is consistent with the finding that richer individuals tend to select high-
premium plans in Medicare Part D, independent of their risk; see Heiss et al . (2013).
Plan-choice stage
Turning to the results for the plan-choice stage, shown in Table 10, note first that in our
two-stage model, plan choices are made only by attentive individuals. While individu-
als without a default plan always pay attention, our model estimates imply an average
attention probability of 32% for individuals who have a default. Consequently, there is
a 68% probability of being inattentive. Individuals with default plan who are inatten-
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tive stay in their default plan and do not enter the choice stage. For the others, plan
choices are modeled by a mixed (random parameters) multinomial logit specification with
heteroskedasticity. In our preferred Model V, the variance of the errors is a function of
acuity and the coeﬃcients of plan characteristics vary with acuity as well. For each plan
characteristic k, we therefore report and discuss the values of  0k and  
q
k as defined in
equation (5).
The results for the plan-choice stage show sensible signs for all coeﬃcients, and to the
extent that they are comparable, they are also in line with earlier results from static plan-
choice models such as Abaluck and Gruber (2011) and Heiss et al . (2013). In particular,
individuals are more likely to choose a plan if it has lower OOP, lower premium, lower
deductible, and higher ICL. The marginal eﬀect of having gap coverage is about 0 on
average. Also, the eﬀect of a plan’s premium is three times as large as that of its implied
OOP cost, which confirms earlier findings that individuals are too sensitive to the premium
as the most salient feature, see e.g. Abaluck and Gruber (2011) and Abaluck and Gruber
(2016a).
In addition to these plan features, the plan-choice model also contains a dummy variable
for the default plan. It has a statistically significant and quantitatively important eﬀect.
We derive an estimate of switching costs from the associated coeﬃcient below. Finally,
we find that individuals are more likely to choose a plan whose implied OOP cost variance
is lower, suggesting that individuals are risk averse and value the insurance component of
Medicare Part D.
As before, the quantitative interpretation of the results focuses on marginal eﬀects, which
we compute both unconditional and conditional on attention. The unconditional marginal
eﬀect measures the overall change in the probability of choosing a plan associated with a
change in the respective plan feature, averaged across plans and individuals. For example,
the probability that a plan is chosen decreases by 0.11 percentage points with an increase
in the annual premium by $100. Given that individuals choose, on average, between
roughly 50 plans and thus a priori the probability of choosing a plan is roughly 2 percent,
this corresponds to a sizable 5.5 percent increase.
When conditioning on attention, marginal eﬀects are larger in absolute value, except for
the marginal eﬀect of the default plan dummy, which captures switching costs. This
increase reflects the fact that the eﬀects of the plan characteristics are watered down by
inattention when not conditioning on attention. For example, a plan’s annual premium
has a lower impact on its choice probability among all individuals than among the subset
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of individuals who pay attention. That is, those who are inattentive do not even consider
the plan’s premium when making their choice.
The unconditional marginal eﬀect of the default plan dummy measures the overall diﬀer-
ence in choice probabilities between the default plan and an otherwise identical alternative.
We interpret this quantity as a measure of average inertia. Part of this inertia is driven
by inattention as discussed above. The marginal eﬀect conditional on attention reflects
the part of inertia that is due to switching costs.
Figure 3 illustrates how the unconditional marginal eﬀect of the default plan dummy varies
with acuity. Almost all individuals in the lowest acuity decile stick with their default plan.
As acuity increases this share declines. In the top decile the median marginal eﬀect of
the default plan dummy is only about 50 percentage points.
As discussed before, the coeﬃcient of the default plan dummy variable can be interpreted
as a measure of switching costs. The raw model parameters are measured in ‘utility
units’. We can translate them into dollar units because a price variable (plan premium)
is included among the regressors.29 Switching costs, cit, are calculated as ratio of the
coeﬃcient of the old plan dummy and the coeﬃcient of the premium (multiplied by 1000
because of the scaling of the premium variable),
cit =  1000  it
 premium,it
. (15)
In our preferred Model V both parameters are allowed to vary with acuity. Figure 4 shows
the resulting relationship between acuity and average switching costs.30 We condition
acuity on attention, as switching costs are only relevant for attentive individuals. For
individuals with the lowest acuity, switching costs estimates become very large whereas
for high acuity people they approach 0. There is also an association between attention and
switching costs as Figure 5 illustrates. Those with low switching costs are more attentive
and vice versa.
Returning to Table 10, switching costs imply an increase of the probability of choosing
the default plan by 30.4 percentage points conditional on attention. Not conditioning on
attention, the overall probability of choosing the default plan is 76.1 percentage points
higher than the probability of choosing an otherwise identical plan. This large uncondi-
tional eﬀect arises because all inattentive individuals stay in the default plan by definition.
29 We choose premium to translate ‘utility units’ into dollar units because as discussed above it is the
most salient among the price variables included in the model.
30 We set the random coeﬃcient  i to zero so that switching costs we report are the conditional average
w.r.t. acuity.
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Finally, we discuss the estimates of the acuity interaction terms,  q and  q. The estimated
coeﬃcients are highly statistically significant, which shows that individuals’ valuations of
plan characteristics varies with acuity. The overall picture is that individuals with high
acuity value the financial characteristics of plans more strongly.31 However, the specific
estimates are not straightforward to interpret because of the underlying heterogeneity
together with the acuity interactions. One way to illustrate the heterogeneity is to look
at the distribution of the marginal eﬀects, which is partly due to acuity. Table 11 shows the
5th percentile, the median, and the 95th percentile of the conditional and unconditional
marginal eﬀects (whereas Table 10 shows just the means). For example, the marginal
eﬀect of an increase in the annual premium by $100 varies between minus 2.7 percentage
points at the 5th percentile and about 0 at the 95th percentile. The variation in marginal
eﬀects is considerable for all plan characteristics, including the default plan dummy. This
is consistent with Figure 3, which however shows heterogeneity with respect to acuity
alone.
5.3 Comparison of Models I–V
In this section, we compare the five models in terms of their behavioral implications. In
particular, it turns out that relative to our preferred Model V, the simpler Models I–IV
lead to diﬀerent estimates of switching costs, inattention, and inertia. Thus, the five
models would also have diﬀerent implications for policy interventions aimed at reducing
inertia to which we return in Section 6 below.
The five models lead to quite diﬀerent estimates of switching costs, as shown in Figure
6. Recall that this measure of switching costs reflects how much individuals are, on
average, willing to pay in order to stay in their default plan. Model I attributes all inertia
to switching costs. It yields large average switching costs of more than $1000. When
we allow for inattention as a source of inertia, estimated switching costs are reduced
substantially to roughly $660. Given that average premiums are only about $550 per
year, this is still a rather high number. Further reductions in estimated switching costs
arise when we allow for unobserved heterogeneity in the attention stage (Model III) and
in the plan-choice stage (Model IV). The reduction in switching costs as we move from
Model I to Model IV is somewhat mechanical: In Model I, all inertia realized in the data
31 The fact that in our preferred Model V acuity has a rich interaction structure explains that by itself
is not statistically significant (see Table 10). In the simpler Model IV, where acuity is not interacted
with plan characteristics it is significant (see Table A7).
31
can only result from switching costs. As additional channels that might explain inertia
are opened up, switching costs tend to go down.
The situation is more complicated once we, in addition, allow for heterogeneity in switch-
ing costs. Figure 4 already showed that this heterogeneity is substantial, with extremely
high switching costs for those with low acuity. Figure 6 shows the mean within each
quartile of switching costs. For individuals in the bottom quartile (i. e., likely those with
high acuity) switching costs are even lower than in Model IV. In contrast, in the upper
quartile switching costs are, on average, about three times as large as in Model I. This
result might be surprising but it reflects the fact that low acuity individuals very rarely
switch plans. We draw two important implications from these results: First, estimates of
switching costs depend heavily on the structure of the model and tend to decline as the
attention stage is introduced and made more flexible. Second, switching costs are related
to individuals’ acuity (and indirectly to those characteristics that enter the acuity model);
allowing for preference heterogeneity in the choice stage is particularly important.
Similarly to the estimates of switching costs, the other parameter estimates and marginal
eﬀects also change across model specifications. In the Appendix we report these estimates,
see Tables A1–A7 which correspond to Tables 9 and 10 above. Furthermore, our models
diﬀer in how much of inertia is attributed to inattention and switching costs, respectively.
As explained above, inertia is captured by the unconditional marginal eﬀect of the default
plan dummy. Model I – which does not allow for inattention – results in a large estimate of
switching costs (see Figure 6) and underestimates average inertia (41 percentage points,
see Table A1). Along with declining switching costs, the estimate of average inertia
increases to 81.4 percentage points in Model IV (see Table A7). In Model V the estimate
of average inertia is similar (76.1 percentage points with a median 0.78) but there is
considerable heterogeneity, see Figure 3.
6 Simulations: Forcing attention and removing switching costs
Several policy interventions aimed at increasing switching rates have been suggested in
the literature, both in Medicare Part D and in other markets where consumer inertia is
an issue. Such proposals typically aim to reduce the transaction costs associated with
switching plans (e. g., Hoadley et al . (2013)); increase attention using reminders, nudges,
and other information shocks (e. g., Sinaiko et al . (2013)); or reduce the complexity of
the choice environment, for instance by reducing the number of available options (e. g.,
Frank and Lamiraud (2009), Besedeš et al . (2015)). Our simulations are also related to
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a series of studies investigating “active choice” policies, including Carroll et al . (2009),
Keller et al . (2011), and Chetty et al . (2014).
We use the estimates of our five models to simulate the eﬀects of two counterfactual
scenarios on the probability that individuals switch plans and on ex post overspending.
In the first scenario, we force all individuals to pay attention. In the second scenario,
we set switching costs to zero. These two scenarios are extreme and therefore allow
us to bound the eﬀects of more realistic interventions that increase attention or reduce
switching costs. We focus on the most comprehensive and statistically superior Model V.
As discussed in section 5, Models I–IV which are nested in Model V are rejected both by
likelihood ratio tests and perform much worse in explaining observed choices according
to the AIC and BIC information criteria. However, it is not clear a priori whether this
translates into diﬀerent conclusions when they are used for counterfactual simulations. It
is therefore instructive to simulate the counterfactual scenarios for these four models as
well.
Figures 7 and 8 display the simulation results. For Models I–V, we report the average
probability to switch and average overspending for three scenarios: the baseline case (i. e.,
using the estimates based on the observed choice data as reported in Section 5) and the
two counterfactual interventions.
As panel (a) of Figure 7 shows the eﬀects of the counterfactual interventions vary sub-
stantially across the five models. In Model I, which does not have an attention stage,
removing switching costs increases the mean switching probability dramatically from 10.4
percent to 85.5 percent. Once the model includes an attention stage, the eﬀect of re-
moving switching costs becomes smaller, while forcing attention increases the switching
probability. In Model IV the eﬀect of forcing attention is large with an implied switch-
ing probability of almost 68 percent. However, in Model IV switching costs do not vary
with acuity. To the extent that attention and switching costs both vary with acuity, the
estimates of the eﬀects of forcing attention or removing switching costs are distorted. In
the full Model V, these two counterfactual interventions lead to smaller increases in the
switching probability of 25.5 percent and 28.8 percent, respectively, which are arguably
more realistic.
Panel (b) of Figure 7 illustrates how much acuity matters for the eﬀects of these coun-
terfactual interventions. Already in the baseline situation, switching probabilities for low
acuity individuals are negligible at 1.3 percent, whereas in the high acuity group they
average to 25 percent. The eﬀects of the counterfactual interventions are also larger in
absolute terms for the high acuity individuals.
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Figure 8 shows the eﬀects of the two counterfactual interventions on average overspend-
ing. The picture is similar as for switching probabilities. The reduction in overspending
induced by forcing attention is more modest in Model V than in Model IV, but still rel-
evant with a decrease by almost 10 percent. Again, heterogeneity with respect to acuity
is important as shown in panel (b). Overspending decreases with acuity in baseline and
the relative reduction associated with the two counterfactual interventions is larger for
the high acuity group. The strongest eﬀect arises for the high acuity group in the forced
attention scenario (a reduction of about 22 percent). One implication of these results is
that both interventions do not reduce overspending for low acuity individuals and they
help high acuity individuals the most.
The simulation results obtained from Model V provide additional insights on the het-
erogeneity of the eﬀects of counterfactual interventions. Figure 9 shows the empirical
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of overspending in the baseline scenario and in
the two counterfactual scenarios: Both interventions lead to a reduction over much of the
distribution but removing switching costs seems to lead to an increase in overspending for
some individuals. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 10 which displays the empirical
CDFs of the reduction in overspending that is induced by the two counterfactual simula-
tions, relative to the baseline case. Forcing attention is associated with higher reductions
in overspending. Interestingly, in both counterfactual scenarios a sizable fraction of in-
dividuals choose plans that imply higher overspending. The increase in overspending is
larger in the no switching costs scenario. Again, underlying these results is substantial
heterogeneity with respect to acuity.
The two graphs in Figure 11 show the distributions of the reduction in overspending
induced by policy interventions stratified by acuity. Graph (a) shows that the savings
induced by forcing attention are much higher for high acuity individuals as they make
better choices when forced to do so even if they were inattentive in baseline. In contrast,
the reduction in overspending does not vary as much with acuity when switching costs
are removed, as shown in Graph (b). Our interpretation is that with the attention stage
in place, low acuity people are much less likely to enter the choice stage, so removing
switching costs will not aﬀect them much. Moreover, low acuity people tend to choose
worse plans in the choice stage, as shown in Figure 8 (b) above. High acuity individuals
have lower switching costs to begin with, so the eﬀect of this intervention is relatively
small for them, too.
An important implication of our simulation results is that while some individuals profit
when they are forced to pay attention, others are harmed – at least with respect to ex post
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overspending. For policymakers, the balance between winners and losers of such reforms
is of particular interest. The magnitudes of these eﬀects depend on whether heterogeneity
in acuity is allowed for, as we do in our preferred Model V.
These are interesting interaction eﬀects that should be accounted for when policy inter-
ventions are simulated using behavioral models. Beyond the specific structure and the
application to Medicare Part D, we believe that highlighting this channel is an important
contribution of our model.
7 Summary and conclusions
In Medicare Part D and other health insurance markets, only few consumers switch plans
across years; many fail to switch to cheaper plans with comparable coverage and thus
forego significant savings. In this paper, we separated channels that contribute to this
high level of inertia: inattention to plan choice and perceived costs of switching plans. To
characterize these two sources of inertia, we developed a two-stage panel data model of
plan choices. The first stage models whether individuals pay attention to their plan choice
or not. Given that individuals pay attention, the second stage models the plan choice in a
discrete choice framework. The model includes switching costs and allows for unobserved
individual-specific heterogeneity in acuity that leads to correlation of the two stages. We
estimate the model based on a sample of individuals in stand-alone PDP plans.
Our analysis highlights the fact that in the market for Medicare Part D stand-alone plans,
attention to the possibility of switching plans is triggered by events and experiences that
are salient during the open-enrollment period. In particular, for those individuals who do
not have gap coverage in their current plan, having reached the gap is associated with a
higher propensity to switch. Premium and formulary changes also trigger attention, but
the eﬀect of premium changes is much larger than that of changes in OOP costs induced
by changes to the formulary. This finding is interesting since formulary changes are clearly
relevant for switching decisions but not as salient as premium changes. An implication
for firm behavior is that consumers’ reactions to increases in their plans’ costs will be
larger when they are implemented via the premium rather than other characteristics,
as for example copayments or obscure details of the formulary benefit design including
tier assignment of specific drugs. Furthermore, our results suggest that new plans in the
market may not be considered by inattentive consumers, to the extent that market entry
is not salient to them.
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Another interesting finding is that acuity declines with experience, which seems inconsis-
tent with the notion that people learn. This result corroborates recent findings of Abaluck
and Gruber (2016a) who also argue that choice inconsistencies in Medicare Part D in-
creased over time. Also, individuals who pay attention in the baseline scenario have higher
acuity and therefore make better decisions, at least in terms of total costs associated with
their plan choice and current prescription drug use, than those who do not pay attention.
Finally, our estimates indicate that even conditional on attention, there are still consid-
erable implicit switching costs. Understanding the sources of these switching costs is an
important topic for future research. Another interesting extension would be to modify the
model so that it applies to the Medicare population eligible for the low-income subsidy
whose acuity may be lower than that of the stand-alone enrollees. These open issues
not withstanding, our two-stage model opens up the possibility to simulate the eﬀects of
policies that aim at increasing plan switching by making the economic determinants of
optimal health insurance plan choices more salient.
The simulations we performed using the estimates of our full two-stage choice model pro-
vide several interesting insights that diﬀer from those one would obtain from simpler ones.
For example, as a thought exercise consider eliminating default re-enrollment and forcing
consumers to pay attention. This would almost certainly increase switching rates, and
probably improve overall welfare, but with exceptions that would tend to be concentrated
among low-acuity consumers. Alternatively, consider assigning each returning enrollee a
default plan that minimizes their ex ante overspending, rather than automatically tak-
ing their previous plan as a default. This would not only increase attention, but would
forcefully nudge inattentive enrollees in the direction of reduced overspending. Even low-
acuity individuals should see welfare improvements, with their high switching costs now
operating to keep them from switching away from the favorable default.
More generally, our findings suggest that removing inattention, in our case by forcing
every beneficiary to make an active choice, has eﬀects on switching rates that are at
least as large as those associated with removing switching costs. This finding echoes
Kiss (2014) who found that in the Hungarian car insurance market, a public campaign
aimed at increasing switching rates mainly acted through manipulating attention, rather
than switching costs. Moreover, we demonstrate that the evaluation of such interventions
requires structural models that allow for heterogeneity of consumers with respect to their
acuity – that is, their ability and diligence in making diligent decisions.
Recent literature has stressed that reducing the number of available plans is another
intervention that would conceivably improve plan choices and increase switching rates.
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We leave to future research the issue of whether a structural choice model like ours could
reliably capture the eﬀects of changing the number of available options, as discussed by
Ericson and Sydnor (2017) and Gruber (2017).32 Our model could potentially also be
used to study the eﬀects of simplifying the Plan Finder or of providing more elaborate,
personalized decision support tools. Recent studies by McGarry et al . (2018) and Bundorf
et al . (2019), respectively, suggest that such interventions can improve choices in health
insurance markets like Medicare Part D considerably.
The welfare consequences of consumer inertia in health insurance markets are complex
and depend on the specific setting. Our findings add to the existing evidence on the excess
costs associated with suboptimal plan choices and on the importance of inertia observed
in health insurance markets. It seems obvious that consumers should be encouraged to
review their health plans more frequently. However, Handel (2013) argues that policies
that nudge consumers to better decisions by reducing inertia also exacerbate adverse
selection, which potentially leads to a reduction in overall welfare. A further issue is
that removing frictions might lead to market unravelling, but as Handel and Kolstad
(2015) argue, risk-adjustment could mitigate the negative eﬀects of reducing information
frictions. Handel et al . (2015) explore this issue further. We leave an extension of our
present analysis that would allow for the computation of welfare eﬀects to future research.
We note, however, that in addition to these issues, such an extension would necessarily
involve additional functional from assumptions, as pointed out in a related context by
Ketcham et al . (2015) and Abaluck and Gruber (2016b).
Another area of research where our two-stage model might be fruitfully employed is the
industrial organization of health insurance markets, along the lines of Ho et al . (2017) and
Polyakova (2016). Our two-stage model could be used to study how diﬀerent interventions
that reduce inertia aﬀect market equilibria and prices over time. However, as Abaluck
and Gruber (2016a), Decarolis (2015), and Decarolis et al . (2019) argue, analyzing the
choice set evolution is especially complicated due to the rules governing assignment of
low-income subsidy enrollees to plans.
More generally, our empirical findings are relevant for the emerging literature on the eﬀects
of inattention on consumer choices and their implications for firm behavior, reviewed for
32 The key issue here is that in data on Medicare Part D, the number of available plans has varied rather
little over time. In experimental studies such as Besedeš et al . (2015), the number of options can be
manipulated over a much larger range.
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instance by Grubb (2012) and Grubb (2015).33 Our results add to the still relatively scarce
evidence showing that inattention and attention shocks matter in high-stakes financial
decisions.34 Further, we show that interventions such as active choice policies might
alleviate market distortions that arise from inattention. Our findings also stress that
allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in such models is crucial.
33 These papers also highlight connections between inattention and biased expectations or overconfidence.
Exploring these biases in the context of Medicare Part D would be interesting but seems infeasible
with administrative data on plan choices alone.
34 This evidence includes Stango and Zinman (2014) on bank overdraft fees, Helmers et al . (2016) on
online shopping, and Crossley et al . (2017) on retirement savings.
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Table 1: Sample selection
Entire 20% Selection criteria Estimation sample
2007 9,300,230
2008 9,530,809 1,082,665 74,848
2009 9,781,213 1,144,094 79,181
2010 10,016,372 1,158,315 80,426
Notes: Selection criteria: US residents, aged 65+, enrolled in stand-alone non-employer PDP plan, do not
receive low-income subsidies (non-LIS), not dual-eligible, enrolled in Part D continuously in 12 months
in the reference year (t) and prior year (t 1) – unless the individual has no default plan – and no missing
data. Estimation sample randomly selects 100,000 individuals who meet all selection criteria in at least
one year. Because of later enrollment, death, or not meeting all selection criteria for the whole time
period, the panel data set is unbalanced and the number of observations is smaller than 100,000 in each
year.
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Table 2: Individuals with and without default plan
With default plan
Stayers Switchers All Without default plan
(%) (%) (%) (%) N
2008 86.59 10.16 96.75 3.25 74,848
2009 86.42 10.27 96.69 3.31 79,181
2010 88.05 9.44 97.49 2.51 80,426
All years 87.03 9.95 96.98 3.02 234,455
Notes: Individuals who do not have a default plan are new to Part D (roughly 97% of those without a
default plan). The others do not have a default plan because their t 1 plan is terminated and there is
no cross-walked other plan that they are defaulted to (roughly 3%).
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Table 3: Ex post total costs and overspending
With default plan
Stayers Switchers All Without default plan Total
Mean ex post total costs
2008 1271.8 1328.1 1277.7 1241.2 1276.5
2009 1440.2 1273.5 1422.5 1257.8 1417
2010 1459.2 1296 1443.3 1294 1439.6
All years 1393.3 1298.6 1383.6 1262.4 1379.9
Mean ex post overspending
2008 329.9 218.7 318.2 283.6 317.1
2009 397.4 203.9 376.8 260.4 373
2010 398.3 206.7 379.8 255.2 376.6
All years 376.3 209.6 359.2 266.9 356.4
Notes: Based on estimation sample. Ex post total costs are costs that consumers have realized in their
chosen plan, i. e., costs based on prescription drugs taken in year t. Ex post overspending is the diﬀerence
between ex post total costs in the plan that a consumer has chosen and the ex post total costs that a
consumer would have realized in the least-cost alternative plan.
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Table 4: Ex ante total costs and overspending in default and chosen plans
Stayers Switchers
Default plan = chosen plan Default plan Chosen plan
Mean ex ante total costs
2008 1315.7 1591.1 1417
2009 1428.7 1502.9 1303
2010 1470 1509.8 1331.4
All years 1407.1 1533.9 1349.4
Mean ex ante overspending
2008 354.8 424.2 250.1
2009 409.7 423.9 223.9
2010 425.4 409.3 230.9
All years 397.7 419.2 234.7
Median ex ante overspending
2008 274.3 325.2 179.2
2009 341.5 357.6 158.8
2010 347.6 316.4 171.8
All years 323.6 335.3 170.1
Share with zero ex ante overspending
2008 3.39 1.05 13.21
2009 1.95 0.89 17.31
2010 2.65 1.17 17.04
All years 2.65 1.03 15.88
Notes: Based on estimation sample. Ex ante total costs are costs in (default or chosen) plan in t,
calculated based on each consumer’s prescription drug use in t 1. Ex ante overspending is the diﬀerence
between ex ante total costs in (default or chosen) plan and ex ante total costs in the least-cost alternative.
As ex ante overspending is not available for most beneficiaries without a default, they are not included
in this table.
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Table 5: Model specifications
Model
I II III IV V
Behavioral component Parameters
Plan choice with switching costs  0,  0, 2  X X X X X
Attention stage ⇣ X X X X
Acuity (latent) in attention stage ↵ X X X X
Unobserved heterogeneity in acuity  c X X X
Acuity in choice stage via error variance ⌘ X X
Acuity in choice stage via interactions  q,  q X
Notes: Parameters not included in a model are restricted to zero. The vectors  0 and  q collect the
coeﬃcients of the plan characteristics as defined in equation (5).
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics – estimation sample
With default plan Without
Switchers Stayers All default plan
Attention triggers
Part D experience in t 1
Gap coverage [D] 0.15 (0.35) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34)
Hit the gap [D] 0.23 (0.42) 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39)
Gap coverage & hit the gap [D] 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21)
Hit catastrophic region [D] 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16)
Changes in features of the t 1 plan
Plan consolidated [D] 0.1 (0.31) 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38)
Change of premium [$1000] 0.13 (0.11) 0.07 (0.08) 0.08 (0.09)
Change of deductible [$1000] 0.01 (0.05) 00 (0.05) 00 (0.05)
Change of ICL [$1000] 0.15 (0.05) 0.15 (0.05) 0.15 (0.05)
OOP cost eﬀect of formulary change [$1000] 0.05 (0.17) 0.04 (0.16) 0.05 (0.16)
Tiers with increases in copayments [share] 0.38 (0.35) 0.42 (0.3) 0.41 (0.31)
Switch between copay and coinsurance [D] 0.15 (0.36) 0.08 (0.26) 0.08 (0.28)
Health shocks and health care use in t 1
Onset of costly condition [D] 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32)
Onset of cheap condition [D] 0.29 (0.46) 0.3 (0.46) 0.3 (0.46)
Five or more doctor visits [D] 0.79 (0.41) 0.78 (0.41) 0.78 (0.41)
At least one ER visit [D] 0.25 (0.43) 0.26 (0.44) 0.25 (0.44)
At least one hospital stay [D] 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38)
Determinants of acuity
Male [D] 0.35 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48) 0.46 (0.5)
Non-white [D] 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.25) 0.09 (0.28)
Age 70–79 years [D] 0.46 (0.5) 0.46 (0.5) 0.46 (0.5) 0.43 (0.49)
Age 80 years or older [D] 0.28 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.27 (0.44)
PDP experience [years] 2.75 (0.87) 2.8 (0.88) 2.8 (0.88) 0.24 (0.78)
Low education [ZIP-code share] 0.21 (0.11) 0.21 (0.12) 0.21 (0.12) 0.21 (0.12)
Low income [ZIP-code share] 0.09 (0.07) 0.09 (0.07) 0.09 (0.07) 0.08 (0.07)
High income [ZIP-code share] 0.24 (0.16) 0.25 (0.16) 0.25 (0.16) 0.25 (0.16)
Ever had depression [D] 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 (0.36)
N 23,331 204,053 227,384 7,071
Notes: Means with standard deviations in parentheses. Dummy variables are marked with [D]. Pooled
across years 2007/8-2009/10. Information on experience in t 1 plan for beneficiaries without a default
plan omitted as only available for small fraction among them (those whose t 1 plan was terminated).
Change in cost sharing is defined as the share of tiers on the formulary for which an increase in cost-sharing
occurs. Dollar amounts are measured in 2010 dollars using the CPI.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics – choice sets in estimation sample
With default plan Without
Switchers Stayers All default plan
Number of plans 51.75 (4.33) 51.12 (3.72) 51.18 (3.80) 51.59 (3.79)
OOP cost [$1000] 1.04 (1.17) 0.96 (1.08) 0.97 (1.09) 0.94 (1.14)
Plan characteristics
Annual premium [$1000] 0.55 (0.04) 0.55 (0.04) 0.55 (0.04) 0.54 (0.04)
Deductible amount [$1000] 0.13 (0.02) 0.13 (0.02) 0.13 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02)
ICL amount [$1000] 2.75 (0.10) 2.75 (0.10) 2.75 (0.10) 2.74 (0.10)
No gap coverage [D] 0.76 (0.04) 0.76 (0.04) 0.76 (0.04) 0.76 (0.04)
Default plan [D] 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Variance of OOP cost [($1000)2] 10.31 (5.87) 10.03 (5.60) 10.06 (5.63) 9.74 (5.86)
N 23,331 204,053 227,384 7,071
Notes: Means across averages in individuals’ choice sets with standard deviations in parentheses. Dummy
variables are marked with [D]. Pooled across years 2007/8-2009/10. Default plan is a dummy variable
for the t 1 plan or the cross-walked new plan if the t 1 plan was discontinued. Dollar amounts are
measured in 2010 dollars using the CPI.
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Table 8: Estimated models
Model
I II III IV V
Number of parameters 13 41 42 43 55
Log likelihood -162,598.6 -158,564.9 -157,617.0 -157,110.7 -154,617.8
LR test against model V (df) 15961.6 (42) 7894.2 (14) 5998.4 (13) 4985.8 (12) —
AIC 325,223.2 317,211.8 315,318.0 314,307.4 309,345.6
BIC 325,357.9 317,636.8 315,753.3 314,753.1 309,915.7
Notes: All models are estimated on the unbalanced estimation sample with 234, 455 observations on
100, 000 individuals. On average, they faced around 51.2 alternatives in each choice situation which
translates into 12,003,258 alternatives in total.
50
Table 9: Attention stage and determinants of acuity (Model V)
Average marginal eﬀects
Coeﬃcient SE on attention on switching
Attention stage (⇣)
Constant -1.647 (0.080)
Part D experience in t  1
Gap coverage [D] -0.851 (0.045) -0.138 -0.044
Hit the gap [D] 0.773 (0.045) 0.148 0.042
Gap coverage & hit the gap [D] -0.393 (0.066) -0.067 -0.020
Hit catastrophic region [D] 0.213 (0.074) 0.039 0.011
Changes in features of the t  1 plan
Plan consolidated [D] 0.214 (0.045) 0.039 0.011
Change of premium [$1000] 5.756 (0.120) 1.041 0.307
Change of deductible [$1000] 2.396 (0.252) 0.433 0.128
Change of ICL [$1000] 0.426 (0.309) 0.077 0.023
OOP cost eﬀect of formulary change [$1000] 0.498 (0.073) 0.090 0.027
Tiers with increases in copayments [share] -0.093 (0.043) -0.017 -0.005
Switch between copay and coinsurance [D] 0.693 (0.045) 0.135 0.038
Health shocks and health care use in t  1
Onset of costly condition [D] -0.044 (0.039) -0.008 -0.002
Onset of cheap condition [D] -0.071 (0.028) -0.013 -0.004
Five or more doctor visits [D] 0.190 (0.032) 0.034 0.010
At least one ER visit [D] -0.054 (0.033) -0.010 -0.003
At least one hospital stay [D] -0.062 (0.038) -0.011 -0.003
Determinants of acuity (↵)
Male [D] -0.030 (0.008) -0.005 -0.002
Non-white [D] -0.171 (0.021) -0.030 -0.009
Age 70–79 years [D] -0.065 (0.010) -0.012 -0.003
Age 80 years or older [D] -0.163 (0.016) -0.029 -0.009
PDP experience [years] -0.044 (0.005) -0.008 -0.002
Low education [ZIP-code share] -0.361 (0.049) -0.065 -0.019
Low income [ZIP-code share] -0.139 (0.065) -0.025 -0.007
High income [ZIP-code share] -0.498 (0.046) -0.090 -0.027
Ever had depression [D] -0.055 (0.010) -0.010 -0.003
Standard deviation of unobserved acuity ( c) 0.669 (0.044)
Notes: Average marginal eﬀects on the probability of paying attention and the probability of switching



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Quantiles of marginal eﬀects in the plan-choice stage (Model V)
Unconditional Cond. on attention
5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95%
OOP cost [$1000] -0.0496 -0.0014 -0.0000 -0.1016 -0.0040 -0.0001
Annual premium [$1000] -0.1302 -0.0035 -0.0000 -0.2660 -0.0101 -0.0002
Deductible amount [$1000] -0.0838 -0.0030 -0.0001 -0.1762 -0.0093 -0.0003
ICL amount [$1000] -0.0015 0.0003 0.0125 -0.0019 0.0015 0.0339
No gap coverage [D] -0.0003 0.0000 0.0018 -0.0011 0.0000 0.0034
Default plan [D] 0.5154 0.7823 0.9371 0.0287 0.2674 0.7031
Variance of OOP cost [($1000)2] -0.0039 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0081 -0.0004 -0.0000
Notes: 5% percentile, median and 95% percentile of marginal eﬀects on the probability that plan is
chosen, unconditional and conditional on attention.
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Figure 1: Structure of the two-stage model
Notes: This figure shows the structure of the full two-stage model. We refer to this as Model V below.
Model I–IV are restricted versions of the full model.
54
Figure 2: Acuity and attention probability (Model V)
55
Figure 3: Acuity and inertia (Model V)
Notes: Inertia is the unconditional marginal eﬀect of the default plan dummy. It reflects the diﬀerence
between the probabilities of staying in the t 1 plan and choosing an otherwise identical alternative.
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Notes: Switching cost are calculated as the ratio of the random coeﬃcient and the coeﬃcient of the
premium, see equation (15). The figure shows the conditional average of switching costs w.r.t. acuity.
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Notes: The figure shows the average attention probability as a function of switching costs, calculated as
the ratio of the random coeﬃcient and the coeﬃcient of the premium, see equation (15).
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Notes: This graph shows the average switching cost estimate of Models I–IV. For Model V, which allows
for heterogeneity in switching costs with respect to acuity, the figure shows the average within each
quartile of the resulting switching cost distribution.
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Figure 7: Counterfactual simulations: switching probabilities



































Scenario: Baseline Forced attention No switching costs
































Scenario: Baseline Forced attention No switching costs
Notes: In the “forced attention” scenario, the probability of attention is set to 1 for everyone; in the “no
switching costs” scenario, switching costs are set to zero for everyone. Acuity levels represent terciles of
acuity.
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Figure 8: Counterfactual simulations: average overspending



































Scenario: Baseline Forced attention No switching costs



























Scenario: Baseline Forced attention No switching costs
Notes: In the “forced attention” scenario, the probability of attention is set to 1 for everyone; in the “no
switching costs” scenario, switching costs are set to zero for everyone. Acuity levels represent terciles of
acuity.
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Figure 9: Counterfactual simulations: distribution of overspending (Model V)
Notes: Empirical CDFs of simulated overspending based on Model V. In the “forced attention” scenario,
the probability of attention is set to 1 for everyone; in the “no switching costs” scenario, switching costs
are set to zero for everyone.
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Figure 10: Counterfactual simulations: reduction in overspending (Model V)
Notes: Empirical CDFs of simulated reduction in overspending (i. e., overspending at baseline – counter-
factual overspending) based on Model V. In the “forced attention” scenario, the probability of attention
is set to 1 for everyone; in the “no switching costs” scenario, switching costs are set to zero for everyone.
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Figure 11: Counterfactual simulations: reduction in overspending by acuity (Model V)
(a) Forced attention
(b) No switching costs
Notes: Empirical CDFs of simulated reduction in overspending (i. e., overspending at baseline – coun-
terfactual overspending) based on Model V for terciles of acuity (low, medium, high). In the “forced
attention” scenario, the probability of attention is set to 1 for everyone; in the “no switching costs”
scenario, switching costs are set to zero for everyone.
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Appendix
Table A1: Plan-choice stage (Model I)
Base Average marginal eﬀects
coeﬃcient SE on choosing plan
 0,  0, 2  , ⌘ unconditional cond. on attention
OOP cost [$1000] 1.012 (0.009) -0.009 -0.009
Annual premium [$1000] 2.050 (0.006) -0.026 -0.026
Deductible amount [$1000] -5.649 (0.052) -0.019 -0.019
ICL amount [$1000] 1.221 (0.155) 0.004 0.004
No gap coverage [D] -0.763 (0.030) -0.003 -0.003
Default plan [D] 0.407 0.407
Coeﬃcient mean ( 0) 8.024 (0.024)
Coeﬃcient variance ( 2 ) 2.490 (0.013)
Variance of OOP cost [($1000)2] -0.287 (0.010) -0.001 -0.001
Acuity eﬀect in error variance (⌘) – ( – )
Notes: The base parameters  0,  0, 2  denote the non-interacted components of the coeﬃcients of plan-
characteristics; the model does not include interaction terms with acuity. The unconditional average
marginal eﬀect of the default plan dummy measures inertia. As Model I does not include an attention
stage, unconditional marginal eﬀects and marginal eﬀects conditional on attention are identical. The
plan-choice stage also includes five dummy variables for the largest plans.
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Table A2: Attention stage and determinants of acuity (Model II)
Average marginal eﬀects
Coeﬃcient SE on attention on switching
Attention stage (⇣)
Constant -0.558 (0.062)
Part D experience in t  1
Gap coverage [D] -1.809 (0.038) -0.338 -0.085
Hit the gap [D] 0.546 (0.043) 0.118 0.027
Gap coverage & hit the gap [D] -0.277 (0.059) -0.059 -0.013
Hit catastrophic region [D] 0.014 (0.066) 0.003 0.001
Changes in features of the t  1 plan
Plan consolidated [D] 0.450 (0.045) 0.097 0.022
Change of premium [$1000] 4.282 (0.105) 0.924 0.210
Change of deductible [$1000] 2.977 (0.279) 0.643 0.146
Change of ICL [$1000] 0.627 (0.329) 0.135 0.031
OOP cost eﬀect of formulary change [$1000] 0.498 (0.068) 0.107 0.024
Tiers with increases in copayments [share] -0.045 (0.041) -0.010 -0.002
Switch between copay and coinsurance [D] 0.866 (0.044) 0.185 0.043
Health shocks and health care use in t  1
Onset of costly condition [D] -0.050 (0.038) -0.011 -0.002
Onset of cheap condition [D] -0.054 (0.027) -0.012 -0.003
Five or more doctor visits [D] 0.130 (0.031) 0.028 0.006
At least one ER visit [D] -0.050 (0.031) -0.011 -0.002
At least one hospital stay [D] -0.065 (0.037) -0.014 -0.003
Determinants of acuity (↵)
Male [D] -0.116 (0.026) -0.025 -0.006
Non-white [D] -0.541 (0.048) -0.114 -0.026
Age 70–79 years [D] -0.258 (0.033) -0.055 -0.012
Age 80 years or older [D] -0.520 (0.038) -0.109 -0.024
PDP experience [years] -0.035 (0.023) -0.008 -0.002
Low education [ZIP-code share] -0.835 (0.137) -0.180 -0.041
Low income [ZIP-code share] -0.767 (0.204) -0.166 -0.038
High income [ZIP-code share] -1.394 (0.098) -0.301 -0.068
Ever had depression [D] -0.032 (0.030) -0.007 -0.002
Standard deviation of unobserved acuity ( c) – ( – )
Notes: Average marginal eﬀects on the probability of paying attention and the probability of switching
plans. [D] indicates that variable is a dummy. The attention stage also includes year dummies.
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Table A3: Plan-choice stage (Model II)
Base Average marginal eﬀects
coeﬃcient SE on choosing plan
 0,  0, 2  , ⌘ unconditional cond. on attention
OOP cost [$1000] 1.154 (0.010) -0.010 -0.020
Annual premium [$1000] 2.230 (0.006) -0.029 -0.060
Deductible amount [$1000] -6.121 (0.059) -0.019 -0.039
ICL amount [$1000] 1.202 (0.170) 0.004 0.008
No gap coverage [D] -0.474 (0.035) -0.002 -0.003
Default plan [D] 0.692 0.351
Coeﬃcient mean ( 0,  q) 6.170 (0.034)
Coeﬃcient variance ( 2 ) -2.369 (0.027)
Variance of OOP cost [($1000)2] -0.291 (0.011) -0.001 -0.002
Acuity eﬀect in error variance (⌘) – ( – )
Notes: The base parameters  0,  0, 2  denote the non-interacted components of the coeﬃcients of plan-
characteristics; the model does not include interaction terms with acuity. The unconditional average
marginal eﬀect of the default plan dummy measures inertia. The plan-choice stage also includes five
dummy variables for the largest plans.
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Table A4: Attention stage and determinants of acuity (Model III)
Average marginal eﬀects
Coeﬃcient SE on attention on switching
Attention stage (⇣)
Constant -2.557 (0.067)
Part D experience in t  1
Gap coverage [D] -1.224 (0.050) -0.111 -0.057
Hit the gap [D] 0.503 (0.038) 0.055 0.027
Gap coverage & hit the gap [D] -0.331 (0.068) -0.033 -0.017
Hit catastrophic region [D] 0.043 (0.081) 0.005 0.002
Changes in features of the t  1 plan
Plan consolidated [D] 0.148 (0.046) 0.016 0.008
Change of premium [$1000] 6.655 (0.116) 0.702 0.346
Change of deductible [$1000] 2.637 (0.230) 0.278 0.137
Change of ICL [$1000] 0.272 (0.332) 0.029 0.014
OOP cost eﬀect of formulary change [$1000] 0.647 (0.075) 0.068 0.034
Tiers with increases in copayments [share] -0.250 (0.044) -0.026 -0.013
Switch between copay and coinsurance [D] 0.748 (0.042) 0.086 0.042
Health shocks and health care use in t  1
Onset of costly condition [D] -0.055 (0.040) -0.006 -0.003
Onset of cheap condition [D] -0.063 (0.029) -0.007 -0.003
Five or more doctor visits [D] 0.105 (0.034) 0.011 0.005
At least one ER visit [D] -0.055 (0.033) -0.006 -0.003
At least one hospital stay [D] -0.063 (0.039) -0.007 -0.003
Determinants of acuity (↵)
Male [D] -0.130 (0.030) -0.013 -0.007
Non-white [D] -0.629 (0.064) -0.060 -0.030
Age 70–79 years [D] -0.255 (0.036) -0.026 -0.013
Age 80 years or older [D] -0.594 (0.043) -0.057 -0.028
PDP experience [years] 0.014 (0.024) 0.001 0.001
Low education [ZIP-code share] -1.141 (0.158) -0.120 -0.059
Low income [ZIP-code share] -0.590 (0.233) -0.062 -0.031
High income [ZIP-code share] -1.411 (0.117) -0.149 -0.073
Ever had depression [D] -0.073 (0.036) -0.008 -0.004
Standard deviation of unobserved acuity ( c) 1.920 (0.035)
Notes: Average marginal eﬀects on the probability of paying attention and the probability of switching
plans. [D] indicates that variable is a dummy. The attention stage also includes year dummies.
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Table A5: Plan-choice stage (Model III)
Base Average marginal eﬀects
coeﬃcient SE on choosing plan
 0,  0, 2  , ⌘ unconditional cond. on attention
OOP cost [$1000] 1.197 (0.009) -0.010 -0.039
Annual premium [$1000] 2.259 (0.006) -0.029 -0.112
Deductible amount [$1000] -5.855 (0.061) -0.018 -0.068
ICL amount [$1000] 1.090 (0.172) 0.003 0.013
No gap coverage [D] -0.626 (0.036) -0.002 -0.009
Default plan [D] 0.810 0.209
Coeﬃcient mean ( 0,  q) 3.750 (0.052)
Coeﬃcient variance ( 2 ) 1.272 (0.062)
Variance of OOP cost [($1000)2] -0.275 (0.011) -0.001 -0.003
Acuity eﬀect in error variance (⌘) – ( – )
Notes: The base parameters  0,  0, 2  denote the non-interacted components of the coeﬃcients of plan-
characteristics; the model does not include interaction terms with acuity. The unconditional average
marginal eﬀect of the default plan dummy measures inertia. The plan-choice stage also includes five
dummy variables for the largest plans.
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Table A6: Attention stage and determinants of acuity (Model IV)
Average marginal eﬀects
Coeﬃcient SE on attention on switching
Attention stage (⇣)
Constant -3.165 (0.061)
Part D experience in t  1
Gap coverage [D] -0.820 (0.044) -0.068 -0.042
Hit the gap [D] 0.681 (0.034) 0.066 0.041
Gap coverage & hit the gap [D] -0.490 (0.065) -0.042 -0.026
Hit catastrophic region [D] 0.271 (0.072) 0.026 0.016
Changes in features of the t  1 plan
Plan consolidated [D] -0.088 (0.043) -0.008 -0.005
Change of premium [$1000] 7.165 (0.109) 0.654 0.403
Change of deductible [$1000] 2.245 (0.216) 0.205 0.126
Change of ICL [$1000] 0.805 (0.326) 0.074 0.045
OOP cost eﬀect of formulary change [$1000] 0.579 (0.070) 0.053 0.033
Tiers with increases in copayments [share] -0.383 (0.042) -0.035 -0.022
Switch between copay and coinsurance [D] 0.677 (0.038) 0.067 0.042
Health shocks and health care use in t  1
Onset of costly condition [D] -0.065 (0.039) -0.006 -0.004
Onset of cheap condition [D] -0.091 (0.027) -0.008 -0.005
Five or more doctor visits [D] 0.124 (0.032) 0.011 0.007
At least one ER visit [D] -0.019 (0.032) -0.002 -0.001
At least one hospital stay [D] -0.024 (0.037) -0.002 -0.001
Determinants of acuity (↵)
Male [D] -0.115 (0.033) -0.010 -0.006
Non-white [D] -0.652 (0.074) -0.054 -0.033
Age 70–79 years [D] -0.255 (0.038) -0.022 -0.014
Age 80 years or older [D] -0.716 (0.046) -0.059 -0.036
PDP experience [years] -0.051 (0.021) -0.005 -0.003
Low education [ZIP-code share] -1.347 (0.174) -0.123 -0.076
Low income [ZIP-code share] -0.491 (0.259) -0.045 -0.028
High income [ZIP-code share] -1.508 (0.128) -0.138 -0.085
Ever had depression [D] -0.216 (0.040) -0.019 -0.012
Standard deviation of unobserved acuity ( c) 2.262 (0.039)
Notes: Average marginal eﬀects on the probability of paying attention and the probability of switching
plans. [D] indicates that variable is a dummy. The attention stage also includes year dummies.
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Table A7: Plan-choice stage (Model IV)
Base Average marginal eﬀects
coeﬃcient SE on choosing plan
 0,  0, 2  , ⌘ unconditional cond. on attention
OOP cost [$1000] 0.985 (0.011) -0.011 -0.041
Annual premium [$1000] 2.041 (0.009) -0.031 -0.118
Deductible amount [$1000] -4.340 (0.059) -0.017 -0.066
ICL amount [$1000] 0.712 (0.132) 0.003 0.011
No gap coverage [D] -0.473 (0.030) -0.002 -0.009
Default plan [D] 0.814 0.129
Coeﬃcient mean ( 0) 2.421 (0.037)
Coeﬃcient variance ( 2 ) 0.979 (0.033)
Variance of OOP cost [($1000)2] -0.188 (0.009) -0.001 -0.003
Acuity eﬀect in error variance (⌘) -0.329 (0.007)
Notes: The base parameters  0,  0, 2  denote the non-interacted components of the coeﬃcients of plan-
characteristics; the model does not include interaction terms with acuity. The unconditional average
marginal eﬀect of the default plan dummy measures inertia. The plan-choice stage also includes five
dummy variables for the largest plans.
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